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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Was the order of the Court of Appeal's Denying

petitioners' request for judicial review discretionary or did it
constitute a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction?
2.

Are Petitioners required to exhaust their

administrative remedies before seeking judicial review of five
non-final orders of the administrative law judge?
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Petitioners bring this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
78-2a-4 (1992), from an order of the Utah Court of Appeals
entered on May 29, 1992. Respondent, the Division of
Occupational & Professional Licensing ("Division") submits this
brief in opposition to Petitioners' petition for writ of
certiorari pursuant to Rule 50 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure. Utah Court Rules Ann. § (1992).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS
Interpretation of the following statutes rules are
determinative for this appeal: Utah Const, art I § 11, Utah Code
Ann. § 13-1-12 (Supp. 1992), Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(l)
(1989), Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (Supp. 1989), Utah Code Ann. §
63-46b-18 (1989), Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (1992), Utah Rules of
App. Proc. 5, 14, 17, and 19, Utah Rules of Civ. Proc. 65b.
1

Verbatim citation of all statutes and rules listed above are
contained in Appendix D.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Petitioners are licensees of the Division of Occupational &
Professional Licensing ("Division").

Petitioners are licensed to

practice Dentistry and to prescribe and administer controlled
substances*

Petitioners are brothers who practice Dentistry in

two offices located in Spanish Fork and Midvale, Utah.
In August 1989, a petition was filed by the Division
alleging that Petitioners engaged in unprofessional conduct
including incompetence in the practice of dentistry, fraudulent
billing and record keeping practices, over-prescribing controlled
substances, engaging in inappropriate physical contact with
patients and employees including sexual acts with a patient in
exchange for drugs, and taking lewd nude photographs of a patient
while she was under the influence of nitrous oxide.
On June 14, 1991, counsel for the Division filed a Motion in
Limine to Exclude Irrelevant Evidence.

Petitioners filed their

response on June 26, 1992. Oral argument was heard on the
Division's motion in limine on April 1, 1992. On April 17, 1992,
Administrative Law Judge, Stephen Eklund, issued an order
permitting Petitioner's to present evidence of K.W.'s or any
other witness' prior sexual behavior "with a licensed health care
2

professional within the context of a physician/patient
relationship, both on cross-examination of that witness and for
possible impeachment purposes of rebuttal." (Order on Division's
Motion in Limine, April 17, 1992

p. 9) Only evidence of K.W.'s

or another witness' "general prior sexual history or reputation
shall be excluded." Id.
On June 21, 1991, Petitioners filed a motion to close the
hearing to the public and a memorandum regarding the appropriate
standard of proof for disciplinary hearings.

The Division filed

a response to Petitioner's motion on July 1, 1991. With respect
to the motion to close the hearing, the Salt Lake Tribune filed a
petition to intervene on July 1, 1991. Administrative law judge
Stephen Eklund granted the Tribune's petition on July 2, 1991.
On April 1, 1992 oral argument on Petitioners' motion to
close was heard before the administrative law judge and the
Dentist and Dental Hygienist Licensing Board.

Pursuant to

section 52-4-1 et seq. the Board voted four to two to keep the
hearing open.

On April 7, 1992 the administrative law judge

issued an order on behalf of the Board providing that the hearing
would remain open to the public pursuant to the Utah Open and
Public Meetings Act.

3

On April 1, 1992, argument on the standard of proof was
heard by the ALJ.

The ALJ issued an order on April 17, 1992

stating that the standard of proof in administrative proceedings
is preponderance of the evidence.
All of the above orders of the ALJ are non-final orders, and
a hearing on the merits in this case is scheduled to be heard on
September 28 - October 3, 1992.
ARGUMENT
I. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD DENY PETITIONER'S PETITION
FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
A petition for Writ of Certiorari according to Rule 46
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, is "granted only for
special and important reasons." Utah Rules of App. § (1992).

The

following considerations, while neither controlling nor the only
measure of the Supreme Court's discretion to grant or deny
petitions for writ of certiorari, are listed under Rule 46 as
follows:
(a) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a
decision in conflict with a decision of another panel
of the Court of Appeals on the same issue of law;
(b) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided a
question of state or federal law in a way that is in
conflict with a decision of the Supreme Court;
(c) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a
decision that has so far departed from the accepted and
usual course of judicial proceedings or has so far
sanctioned such a departure by a lower court as to call

4

for an exercise of the Supreme Court's power of
supervision; or
(d) When the Court of Appeals has decided an important
question of municipal, state, or federal law which has
not been, but should be, settled by the Supreme Court.
Utah Rules of App. Proc. § 46 (1992).

None of the considerations

provided under Rule 46 are found in Petitioners' petition for
writ of certiorari.

The Court of Appeal's denial of Petitioners'

interlocutory appeal was merely an exercise of their broad
discretion to grant or deny requests for judicial review.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DISCRETION TO GRANT OR
DENY INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS.
Petitioners sought interlocutory review before the Court
of Appeals of five non-final orders issued by the administrative
law judge ("ALJ") in the administrative proceeding below.
Without stating its reasons for doing so, the Utah Court of
Appeals denied Petitioners' request for interlocutory review and
extraordinary relief.
This petition for writ of certiorari is premised on the
false assumption that the Court of Appeals determined that it was
without jurisdiction to consider Petitioners' appeal. (Petition
for Writ of Certiorari, p. 6-13.) It is clear on the face of the
order that the Court of Appeals made no such determination.
Their order, in its entirety states:

5

This matter is before the court upon a petition
for review of a non-final administrative order.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition is denied.
In light of this ruling, it is further ORDERED that
respondent's motion to accept a late filed response is
denied.
The Court of Appeal's order cannot, nor should it be
construed, as a determination by the court that it lacked
jurisdiction to review Petitioners' interlocutory appeal.
Although it is the Division's assertion that the Court of Appeals
lacks jurisdiction to review non-final administrative orders, the
Court of Appeals did not decide that issue.

The only assumption

that can be made, based on the written order of the Court of
Appeals, is that the court, in its sound discretion, denied
Petitioners' request for judicial review and extraordinary
relief.
To show that the Court of Appeals erred in denying their
interlocutory appeal, Petitioners set forth a somewhat detailed
although flawed analysis of Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (1992 &
Supp.).

Specifically, Petitioners contend that the terms "final

orders" and "decrees" found in that statute are distinct and that
the term "decrees" signifies non-final orders rather final
decrees.

(Petition for writ of certiorari p.7-10)

Petitioners

also invoke well established canons of statutory interpretation
to support their construction of section 78-2a-3(2).
6

Petitioners

argue that the Court of Appeals somehow misinterpreted or ignored
section 78-2a-3(2) and therefore erred in denying their petition
for interlocutory review and extraordinary relief.
Petitioners' arguments lack merit for the following reasons:
First, as expressed above, the Court of Appeals did not hold that
it lacked jurisdiction to review Petitioners' appeal-

There is

no support for Petitioners' claim that Court of Appeals
misinterpreted section 78-2a-3(2).

Second, Petitioners never

raised section 78-2a-3(2) as a grounds for appellate
jurisdiction.

Section 78-2a-3(2) was overlooked entirely.

Because Petitioners neglected to raise section 78-2a-3(2) as a
grounds for appellate jurisdiction on their appeal, Petitioners'
argument that the Court of Appeals misinterpreted section 7 8-2a3(2) is unjustified.

It is also improperly raised as a basis for

appeal in their petition for writ of certiorari.

It is

nonsensical to challenge the decision of the Court of Appeals
over an issue that was not even raised.

Also, Petitioners' claim

has not been properly preserved on appeal to this court.
In their petition for judicial review with the Court of
Appeals, Petitioners' raised two "alternative theories of
jurisdiction", (1) An interlocutory appeal under Rule 14 of the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and (2) an extraordinary writ

7

under civil procedure rule 65B and rule 19 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure. (Petition to the Court of Appeals p. 8-9)
By their own admission, Petitioners' first alternative was
to file their appeal as a request for review under Rule 14.
Petitioners did not file a motion as required under rule 65B or
rule 19. (Petition to the Court of Appeals p. 15)

Instead of

complying with the filing rules, Petitioners asked the court to
choose which alternative theory of jurisdiction was proper, then,
if the court concluded that they were without jurisdiction
pursuant to Rule 14, requested that the court grant Petitioners
leave to properly file a motion in accordance with rule 65B and
appellate Rule 19. (Petition to the Court of Appeals p. 14-15)
Because rule 14, as Petitioners admitted, does not provide
for interlocutory appeals from administrative agencies, and
Petitioners failed to comply with the filing rules under rule 65b
and rule 19, the Court of Appeals had sufficient grounds to deny
Petitioners' interlocutory appeal and request for extraordinary
relief.

The Court of Appeals, in their discretion may also have

declined to exercise its jurisdiction without deciding whether it
had jurisdiction to review the appeal.

Utah Rules of Appellate

Procedure § 5 (1992)(Discretionary Appeals from Interlocutory
Orders).

8

None of the considerations listed under Rule 46 in aid of
this court's authority to grant or deny writs of certiorari are
present in this case.

Unless the Court of Appeals is held by

this court to have abused its discretion in denying Petitioners'
interlocutory appealf Petitioners' petition for writ of
certiorari should be denied.
III. THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS LACKS JURISDICTION TO REVIEW
NON-FINAL ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS.
Although its the Division's contention that the Court of
Appeal's order denying Petitioners' request for interlocutory was
merely discretionary, the Division also asserts in the
alternative that the Court of Appeals would, in any event, have
been required to dismiss Petitioners' petition for lack of
jurisdiction. "It is a court's first duty to determine if it has
jurisdiction."

Varian-Eimac, Inc. v. Lamoreaux, 767 P.2d 570

(Utah App. 1989).

"If the court concludes that it does not have

jurisdiction, it retains only the authority to dismiss the
action." Id.
The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals is conferred by
statute.

Despite Petitioners' arguments to the contrary,

the

court's denial of Petitioners' request for interlocutory review
did not deprive them of a constitutional right under Utah Const,
art. I, sec. 11.

There is no constitutional right to judicial

review. See, DeBrv v. Salt Lake County Bd. of Appeals, 764 P.2d

9

627 (Utah App. 1988),

The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals

is embodied in section 78-2a-3(2)(a) which vests the Court of
Appeals with "[a]ppellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal
adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or appeals
from the district court review of informal
adjudicative proceedings . . .
. . .(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the
requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, in its review of
agency adjudicative proceedings." . . .
Utah Code Ann, § (1992) (emphasis added).

This section also

refers to all other types of cases that confer original appellate
jurisdiction on the Court of Appeals.
In the context of appeals from the final orders of an
administrative agency, the Utah Court of Appeals made this
comment with respect to section 78-2a-3(2)(a): "This general
statute defines the outermost limits of our appellate
jurisdiction, allowing us to review agency decisions only when
the legislature expressly authorizes a right of review."

DeBry

v. Salt Lake County Bd. of Appeals, 764 P.2d 627, 628 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988).

"It is not a catchall provision authorizing us to

review the orders of every administrative agency ... but allows
review only when the legislature expressly authorizes a right of
review."

Id.

10

According to section 78-2a-3(4), compliance with the
administrative procedures act is required by the Court of
Appeals, Utah Code Ann. § (1992).

Section 63-46b-16(l) of the

Administrative Procedures Act grants the Court of Appeals
"jurisdiction to review all final agency action resulting from
formal adjudicative proceedings. Utah Code Ann. § (1989).
Finality, has long been acknowledged as a prerequisite for
judicial review.

While this principle has a well established

history in administrative jurisprudence it is also a prerequisite
to review of decisions from the regular court system.
The ALJ's orders that Petitioners seek to appeal are not
final orders, nor do the interlocutory orders of the ALJ
constitute final agency action as required by administrative
procedures act and section 78-2a-3(2)(a).

A final order will be

issued by the Division only after formal adjudicative proceedings
in this matter have been concluded and all issues pending before
the Division have been determined.
In Sloan v. Board of Review of Industrial Commission,7 81
P.2d 463 (Utah App. 1989), the Utah Court of Appeals held that a
remand order to an administrative law judge was not a final order
and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

In Sloan, the

Utah Industrial Commission adopted the findings of an
administrative law judge but remanded to the administrative law
11

judge the issue of whether the claimant was entitled to medical
expenses.

The Sloan court held that the remand order was not a

final appealable order.

"We agree that an order of the agency is

not final so long as it reserves something to the agency for
further decision." j[d. at 464.
Attempts to seek interlocutory review of non-final orders of
the ALJ in licensing proceedings are not new to the Division nor
to the Court of Appeals.

For example, in Barney v. Division of

Occupational and Professional Licensing, 828 P.2d 542 (Utah Ct.
App.), Cert denied, (Utah Sup. Ct. June 19, 1992) this court
recently denied certiorari to review an order of the Utah Court
of Appeals dismissing an interlocutory appeal from a non-final
order issued by the ALJ in a professional disciplinary
proceeding.

Barney involved a licensed health facility

administrator whose license is still the subject of disciplinary
proceedings initiated by the Division.

The licensee in Barney,

sought interlocutory review with the Utah Court of Appeals of a
non-final order issue by the ALJ.

The order of the ALJ denied

Barney's motion to dismiss the Division's petition based on
double jeopardy grounds.

Referring to Sloan, the Court of

Appeals held it did not have jurisdiction to review the order of
the administrative law judge because the order lacked "finality".
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The court distinguished the requirement of finality with that of
exhaustion of administrative remedies stating:
[T]he issue before the agency and the issue before this
court [in Heinecke v. Dept. of Commerce1 was whether
all levels of agency review were complete at the time
judicial review was sought. In contrast, ... the
requirement of finality contemplates that the agency
proceedings have been brought to their conclusion by
disposition of all issues before the agency. The
denial of a motion to dismiss allows the proceeding to
continue in the agency and is not a final order for
purposes of judicial review.
Barney, 828 P.2d 544 (emphasis added).
In addition to Sloan, Debry and Barney, this court has
recognized the prerequisite of final agency action before a party
may obtain judicial review.

See Heaton v. Second Injury Fund,

796 P.2d 676, 677 (Utah 1990) (The court dismissed the first
petition for review of an ALJ's refusal to grant permanent total
disability benefits because there was no final appealable
order.); Baird v. State, 574 P.2d 713, 718 (Utah 1978)

("The

proper procedure to challenge the statute and the administration
thereof is by judicial review after final administrative action
has been taken.").
Petitioners claim that section 63-46b-14(2) confers
jurisdiction on the Court of Appeals to review non-final orders
under certain circumstances.

Section 63-46b-14(2)(b) provides

that "the court may relieve a party seeking judicial review of
the requirement to exhaust any or all administrative remedies if:
13

(i) the administrative remedies are inadequate; or (ii)
exhaustion of remedies would result in irreparable harm
disproportionate to the public benefit derived from requiring
exhaustion."

Utah Code Ann, § (1989).

Sections 63-46b-14(2)(b) and 63-46b-16(l) both embody the
related requirements of finality and exhaustion of administrative
remedies before seeking judicial review. However the exception to
the exhaustion requirement does not apply to Petitioner's
interlocutory appeal of the ALJ's orders.
IV. SECTION 63-46b-14(2)(b) SHOULD NOT DISPEL OF THE
REQUIREMENT OF FINALITY OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS IN.
Although section 63-46b-14(2)(b) provides an exception to
the requirement that a party exhaust all administrative remedies
before seeking judicial review, it does not provide for automatic
appellate rights every time a party claims that a non-final
decision of an administrative court is in error.

The principle

of exhaustion of administrative remedies and finality are well
established in the jurisprudence of administrative law.

Although

well established, the principles are often confused.
Once agency action commences and adjudicative proceedings
are under way, review of the agency's decisions can only be had
after a final order or final action is taken. Utah Code Ann. §
78-2a-3(2)(a) (1992), Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(1)(1989).

Even

where some, but not all of issues that are raised, may be outside
14

of the competence or jurisdiction of the agency to decide, courts
in this state adhere to the requirement that the agency reach a
final determination on all matters properly before it before
permitting judicial review, Johnson v. Utah State Retirement
Office, 621 P.2d 1234, 1237 (Utah 1980) ("Administrative agencies
do not generally determine the constitutionality of their organic
legislation [citations omitted] But the mere introduction of a
constitutional claim does not obviate the need for exhaustion of
administrative remedies.") l
On the other hand, exhaustion of administrative remedies
allows parties under unusual circumstances to by-pass the
administrative forum all together and seek judicial review or
judicial determination of their claim.

Only in rare

circumstances can parties by-pass the administrative forum and
proceed directly to the courts for relief. In S&G, Inc. v.
Morgan, 797 P. 2d 1085, 1087 (Utah 1990), this court explained,
The requirement of participation as a perquisite
to standing to appeal is a corollary of the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies. It is well
settled under this doctrine that persons aggrieved by
decisions of administrative agencies 'may not, by
refusing or neglecting to submit issues of fact to such
agencies, by-pass them, and call upon the courts to
determine . . . matters properly determinable
originally by such agencies, [citations omitted]
In addition, the court in Johnson noted the well
established principle that " [e]xhaustion of administrative remedies
may not be necessary when it would serve no useful purpose." Id.
15

The exhaustion requirement should not be excused for
interlocutory review of an ALJ's orders concerning matters of
procedure, the admissibility of evidence, etc.

An interlocutory

order of an administrative law judge that does not affect the
rights of the parties or which determines questions of law or
fact pertaining to the merits of the case are not contemplated in
the statute excusing the exhaustion requirement.

The Division

has not taken any action with respect to Petitioner's licensees.
Moreover, Petitioners' appeal does not concern any question
outside the competence of the ALJ to determine.

The Division

should be afforded the opportunity to bring proceedings on this
matter to a conclusion after determining all issues that are
within its jurisdiction to decide.
V. PETITIONERS' CLAIM OF IRREPARABLE HARM AND
INADEQUATE ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES ARE WITHOUT MERIT.
To excuse their failure to exhaust administrative remedies
or await a final order, Petitioners claim that they will suffer
irreparable harm if the proceedings before the Division are
allowed to continue on its present course.

Petitioners

specifically refer to the publicity this case, which is now
nearly three years old, has received in the media and press.
Although a complete review of the media and publicity that has
attended this case is not warranted and is irrelevant, it is
worthy to note that Petitioners have also made numerous oral and
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written statements to the press, including statements to the
national and local media.
Regardless of the attention imparted to these proceedings by
the press, it has been made evident that the Dental Board, who
will serve as the fact finder in this matter, has not been
tainted by any pre-hearing publicity.

Petitioners' conducted

voir dire of the Dental Board on April 1, 1992.

During voir

dire, it became absolutely clear that the Dental Board has been
largely unaware and completely unaffected by any media attention
directed at this case (a favorable result that becomes more
difficult to sustain as this hearing is delayed by court actions
filed by Petitioners).

Petitioners passed on all members of the

Board for cause, excluding the Board's public member who served
as a past director of the Department of Commerce.

The public

member was subsequently recused from participating in these
proceedings because of his prior relationship with the Division.
Petitioners claim that no adequate remedy exists other than
an interlocutory appeal or extraordinary relief to prevent
irreparable harm to their reputations.

Regardless of whether

interlocutory relief is granted, the courts cannot prevent bad
publicity.

This argument also belies the fact that Petitioners

claim that there has already been extensive publicity in this

17

case.

None of Petitioner's arguments go to the issue of the

adequacy or inadequacy of petitioners' administrative remedies.
Petitioners are afforded administrative remedies that
adequately protect their rights and insure that their licenses
and livelihood will not be harmed without due process of law.
For example, following formal adjudicative proceedings,
Petitioners may seek agency review of the final order with the
Department of Commerce. Utah Code Ann. § 13-1-12. (Supp.1992)
Also, in the event Petitioners' licenses are suspended, revoked
or placed on probation, Petitioners may move to have the ordered
stayed by the agency pending appeal of the agency's decision.
See, Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-18 (1989).

In addition to the

above, Petitioners can also request a stay from the Court of
Appeals pending appeal.
(1992).

Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure § 17

These remedies are more than adequate to protect

Petitioners from the unwarranted invasion of their due process
rights.
VI. THE POTENTIAL HARM TO PETITIONERS BY REQUIRING
EXHAUSTION IS OUTWEIGHED BY THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN
PROCEEDING TO HEARING
Petitioners clearly have a protected property interest in
their licenses as Dentists.

However, courts have long recognized

that although licensee's interest in their livelihood and
profession is substantial, the government's interest in

18

protecting the public health and safety is paramount.
"[G]overnment has a paramount obligation to the protect the
general health of the public.

The right of physicians (or

dentists) to practice their professions is necessarily
subordinate to this governmental interest."

In Re License

Revocation of Polk, 449 A.2d 7, 14 (N.J. 1982); See also Steadman
v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91 (1981) (U.S. Supreme Court implicitly
concluded that there was no fundamental liberty interest at stake
in a proceeding to revoke license to pursue a profession); State
v. Hoffman, 558 P.2d 602, 605 (Utah 1976) (Practice of healing
professions is not a right, but a privilege).
Despite Petitioners' assertion that it would be more
efficient to resolve legal disputes on appeal to this court
before the hearing, this would be the least efficient manner to
resolve the legal issues raised by Petitioners.

Requiring

Petitioners to exhaust their administrative remedies serves to
prevent the impairment of administrative processes by avoidable
interruption and delay, and the conservation of judicial
resources by avoiding piecemeal or interlocutory review.
Moreover, in the event Petitioners are absolved of any
professional violation, review by this court would be moot.
Rather than review administrative orders in piecemeal fashion, it
would be more efficient to review those orders with a complete
19

record in conjunction with all other potential grounds for
appeal.
CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals denial of Petitioners' interlocutory
appeal is a matter within the court's judicial discretion.
Petitioners' Petition for Writ of Certiorari should be denied.
Petitioners' Petition for Writ of Certiorari does not present any
issue of fact or law that warrants review by this court.

None of

the considerations listed under Rule 46 in aid of this court's
discretion to accept or reject writs of certiorari are present.
Submitted this

j//7^day of July, 1992.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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certify that on \'*

I served a copy of the attached RESPONDENT'S ANSWER TO PETITION
FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI to Jackson Howard, counsel for Petitioners
in this matter, by mailing it to him by first class mail with
sufficient postage prepaid to the following address:
Jackson Howard, Esq.
Howard, Lewis & Peterson
120 East 300 North Street
P.O. Box 778
Provo, Utah 84603
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APPENDIX A

MAY291992
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
•^jhrv r Noonan
c\vr* cf (he Court
v&\\ Court of Appeals

00O00

Kent Blaine Hansen and
Brent D. Hansen,
ORDER

Petitioners,
Case No. 920291-CA

v.
Division of Occupational
and Professional Licensing,
Respondent.

Before Judges Orme, Bench, and Billings

(Law & Motion).

This matter is before the court upon a petition for review
of a non-final administrative order.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition is denied.

In

light of this ruling, it is further ORDERED that respondent's
motion to accept a late filed response is denied.
Dated this ^yV^day of May, 1992.

Gregory Jk? Q\

JUN 02 1992
Russell W. Bench, Judge

udith M. Billings, Judge

HOWARD, LEWES I * r a S 3 i

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 29th day of May, 1992, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United
States mail to the parties listed below:
Jackson Howard
Leslie W. Slaugh
Linda J. Barclay
Howard, Lewis & Petersen
Attorneys at Law
120 East 300 North
P.O. Box 778
Provo, UT 84603
Robert E. Steed
Brent A. Burnett
Assistant Attorney General
Tax & Business Regulation Division
36 South State Street, 1100 Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Dated this 29th day of May, 1992.

By < VV.V

^d;?<'/l/ufch-

Deputy C2Terk

APPENDIX B

BEFORE THE DIVISION OP OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSES OF
KENT BLAINE HANSEN AND
BRENT D, HANSEN
TO PRACTICE AS DENTISTS
AND TO PRESCRIBE AND ADMINISTER
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES
IN THE STATE OF UTAH

ORDER ON PROCEDURES
GOVERNING DISPOSITION OF
RESPONDENTS' MOTION TO
CLOSE HEARING
CASE NO. OPL-89-47

Appearances:
Jackson Howard and Leslie W. Slaugh for Respondents
Robert E. Steed for the Division of Occupational and
Professional Licensing
Sharon E. Sonnenreich for the Salt Lake Tribune
BY THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE:
On June 20, 1991, Respondents filed a motion to close the
hearing in the above-entitled matter to all members of the press
and public.

On July 1, 19S1, the Division filed a memorandum

opposing that motion and the Salt Lake Tribune filed a petition
tc intervene with respect to the mciicr.. By Order, dated July 2,
1991, the Court granted that petition and the Intervener's
memorandum in opposition to Respondents7 motion was filed on July
3, 1991.

Respondents filed replies to the submissions by the

Division and the Intervenor on July 9, 1991 and July 10, 1991,
respectively.
Oral argument on the motion was conducted on April 1, 1992
before J. Steven Eklund, Administrative Law Judge for the
Department of Commerce, and the Dentists and Dental Hygienists

Board.

Aside from the merits of the motion, the narrow issue

initially presented was the manner in which the motion should be
addressed.

Specifically, the issue is whether the motion is one

properly before the administrative law judge or the Board.

At

the conclusion of argument in that regard, the Court entered an
order, the terms of which are restated as follows:
CONCLUSIONS OP LAW
Respondents assert parties to a formal adjudicative
proceeding have a statutory right to be present at any hearing,
but urge the press and the public have no such right.
Respondents thus contend the presiding officer may take
appropriate measures to preserve the integrity of the hearing and
may thus exclude the press and public in an appropriate case.
Respondents further assert the presiding officer in this
proceeding is the administrative law judge. Since the Open and
Public Meetings Act (Utah Code Ann. Section 52-4-1, et seq.,
hereinafter, the Act) only applies to meetings convened by a
public body which consists of two or more persons, Respondents
urge it is the administrative law judge - as the presiding
officer - who is authorized to determine wherher the subsequent
hearing in this proceeding should be closed.
The Division and the Intervenor jointly contend the Act
applies to the hearing to be conducted in this proceeding, any
decision to close the hearing is thus governed by the Act and
that determination is to be made by the public body before whom
the hearing will be held.
The Act generally governs meetings convened by a public
2

body, as those terms are defined in Sections 52-4-2(1) and (2),
respectively.

Sections 52-4-2(1) defines "meeting" as:

. . . the convening of a public body, with
a quorum present, whether in person or by
means of electronic equipment, for the
purpose of discussing or acting upon a matter
over which the public body has jurisdiction
or advisory power. . ..
Section 52-4-2(2) defines "public body" as:
. . . any administrative, advisory,
executive or legislative body of the state or
its political subdivisions which consists of
two or more persons that expends, disburses,
or is supported in whole or in part by tax
revenue and is vested with the authority to
make decisions regarding the public's
business . . . .
On April 11, 1977, an opinion was issued (#77-94) by James
L. Barker of the Office of the Utah Attorney General to Ronald E.
Casper, then Director of the Department of Registration, now
known as the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing.
The just-stated opinion was in response to various questions
concerning the scope of the Act with regard to meetings conducted
by boards and committees established pursuant to Section 53-1-1
et seq.

The opinion set forth the conclusion that such boards

and committees are "public bodies" with the meaninc of Section
52-4r2 and that quasi-judicial hearings "to determine findings
and recommendations for disciplinary action" are subject to the
Act.
The Utah Administrative Procedures Act (Section 63-46b-l et
seq., hereinafter, the UAPA) does not expressly provide that
hearings conducted in formal adjudicative proceedings are subject
to the requirements of Section 52-4-1 et seq.
3

Section 63-46b-8

generally sets forth hearing procedures applicable in formal
adjudicative proceedings•

Subsection (1)(i) of that statute

merely provides all hearings "shall be open to all parties".
However, Comments of the Utah Administrative Lav Advisory
Committee on the Drafting and Interpretation of the UAPA (Code
Co, at 14) provide as follows:
Non-parties may also be afforded the
opportunity to observe hearings. See e.g.,
Section 52-4-1 et seq. (Open and Public
Meetings Act).
Given the foregoing, the Court concludes the Act applies to
hearings conducted in professional disciplinary licensure
proceedings initiated by the Division if the presiding officer at
the hearing is a "public body" within the meaning of Section 524-2(2).

The Court also notes Section 13-1-11, which authorizes

the Department to employ administrative law judges "to conduct
hearings for the department".

If an administrative law judge is

the presiding officer duly authorized to conduct a hearing and
subsequently enter an order pursuant to Section 13-1-12(1)(a),
the Act would not apply because an administrative law judge is
not a "public body" within the meaning of the Act.
, Section 63-46b-8(2) of the UAPA expressly provides that
nothing in that section precludes the administrative law judge as the presiding officer - "from taking appropriate measures
necessary to protect the integrity of the hearing".

Further,

R151-46b-10(B) of the rules of procedure which govern
departmental adjudicative proceedings provides:
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Unless ordered by the department for good
cause, if a hearing is conducted, it shall be
open to the public•
Pursuant to the just-quoted rule, an administrative law judge as the presiding officer authorized to conduct a hearing - could
determine to close the hearing for good cause (e.g.,

an in camera

proceeding could be conducted, as was done at the conclusion of
Respondents' April 1, 1992 voir dire examination of the Board).
Such a determination would not be governed by the Act.
However, it is the Board which is duly authorized to act as
the presiding officer in the subsequent hearing in this
proceeding with respect to the entry of findings of fact,
conclusions of law and any recommended order regarding
Respondents' licenses.

Thus, the hearing to be held is governed

by the Act and the decision whether to close the hearing is a
matter properly addressed to the Board.
ORDER
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that Respondents' motion to close
the hearing to be conducted before the Board is a matter governed
by the Act. The Board - as the presiding officer authorized to
enter findings of fact, conclusions of law and a recommended
order subsequent to any such hearing - shall address Respondents'
motion and determine whether the hearing should be closed,
consistent with the provisions of the Act.
Dated this

'v2*~

day of April, 1992
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BEFORE THE DIVISION OP OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING
OF THE DEPARTHENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSES OF
KENT BLAINE HANSEN AND
BRENT D. HANSEN
TO PRACTICE AS DENTISTS
AND TO PRESCRIBE AND ADMINISTER
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES
IN THE STATE OF UTAH

ORDER ON RESPONDENTS'
MOTION TO CLOSE HEARING
CASE NO. OPL-89-47

Appearances:
Jackson Howard and Leslie W. Slaugh for Respondents
Robert E. Steed for the Division of Occupational and
Professional Licensing
Sharon E. Sonnenreich for the Salt Lake Tribune
BY THE BOARD:
On June 20, 1991, Respondents filed a motion to close the
hearing in this proceeding to all members of the press and
public.

On July 1, 1991, the Division filed a memorandum in

opposition to that motion and the Salt Lake Tribune filed a
petition to intervene with respect to the motion.

By Order,

dated July 2, 1991, the Court granted that petition and the
Intervener's memorandum in opposition to Respondents' motion was
filed on July 3, 1991. Respondents filed replies to the
submissions by the Division and the Intervenor on July 9, 1991
and July 10, 1991, respectively*
Oral argument on Respondents' motion was conducted on April
1, 1992 before J. Steven Eklund, Administrative Law Judge for the
Department of Commerce, and the Dentists and Dental Hygienists

Board.

Members of the Board present were Mark L. Christensen,

Paul R. Lunt, Elizabeth A. Reinerth, Max A. Blackham, Floyd R.
Tanner, and Roger E. Grua.

The remaining Board member, William

E. Dunn, was also present, but Mr. Dunn had been recused from any
participation as a Board member in this proceeding and did not
participate with respect to the pending motion.
After the conclusion of oral argument, the Board deliberated
the matter.

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann., Section 52-4-1 et seq.,

the Board subsequently entered an order, the terms of which are
restated as follows:
ORDER
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED Respondents' motion to close the
hearing to be conducted before the Board is denied.
Specifically, Dr. Lunt, Ms, Reinerth, Dr. Blackham, and Dr.
Tanner vote to conduct a hearing in this proceeding which shall
be open to the press and public.

Dr. Christensen and Dr. Grua

would close the hearing.
Dated this _ ^ 2 _ / d a y

of A

Pri1/

i"2
FOR THE BOARD

BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING
OF THE DEPARTHENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSES OF
KENT BLAINE HANSEN AND
BRENT D. HANSEN
TO PRACTICE AS DENTISTS
AND TO PRESCRIBE AND ADMINISTER
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES
IN THE STATE OF UTAH

SUPPLEMENTAL NOTICE
AND ACCOMPANYING ORDER
CASE NO. OPL-89-47

Appearances:
Jackson Howard and Leslie W. Slaugh for Respondents
Robert E. Steed for the Division of Occupational and
Professional Licensing
BY THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE:
The instant adjudicative proceeding was initiated pursuant
to an August 17, 1989 Notice of Agency Action.

The notice, which

was signed by David E. Robinson as the Director of the Division
of Occupational and Professional Licensing, recited a hearing
would be conducted on October 4, 1989 and indicated the presiding
Q^*iro>» ;»•- t^e ^92r",'r.rr would be J. Steven E^ilund

Administrative

Law Judge for the Department of Commerce.
On April 30, 1991, Respondents filed a motion to dismiss.
Oral argument was conducted with respect to that motion on May
23, 1991. Prior to conclusion of that argument, counsel for
Respondents made inquiry regarding the procedures which would
govern any subsequent hearing conducted to address whether a
disciplinary sanction would enter as to Respondents' licenses.
The Court informed counsel for Respondents as to the respective

roles of both the Dentists and Dental Hygienists Board and the
Administrative Law Judge in that process.
Respondents now seek further clarification, urging the
presiding officer in this proceeding should be the Administrative
Law Judge, as initially indicated in the August 17, 1989 notice.
Respondents assert the Administrative Law Judge should enter
findings of fact, conclusions of law and then submit any
recommendation to the Board for its review.

On April 1, 1992,

oral argument was presented as to the just-referenced matter and
the Administrative Law Judge entered an order, the terms of which
are restated as follows:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Respondents assert this proceeding should be conducted in a
manner consistent with that set forth in the August 17, 1989
notice.

Specifically, Respondents urge no basis exists to

designate various presiding officers to act in different
capacities during the course of this proceeding.

The Division

contends the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (hereinafter, the
UAPA) provides such flexibility and does not require the same
individual or body of individuals to act as the presiding officer
for all purposes throughout an adjudicative proceeding.
The UAPA clearly provides that different individuals or
entities may act as the presiding officer with regard to a given
phase of a proceeding.

For example, Section 63-46b-3(2)(a)

provides the notice of agency action shall be signed by "a
presiding officer11. Mr. Robinson thus acted as the presiding
officer for that purpose when the August 17, 1989 notice of
2

agency action was issued.

Section 63-46b-3(2)(a)(x) also

requires the notice of agency action to identify the "name,
title, mailing address and telephone number" of the presiding
officer.

The confusion in this case has been prompted by the

August 17, 1989 notice, which failed to specifically and
adequately inform Respondents as to the respective role of the
Board and the Administrative Law Judge in this proceeding.

In

that regard, it is necessary to review the UAPA, the legislative
history of Section 13-1-12 and Section 58-1-16 and the nature of
agency practice pursuant to those statutes.
The UAPA, which became effective January 1, 1988, generally
applies to all state agencies.

Section 63-46b-2(h) defines

"presiding officer" as:
. . . an agency head, or an individual or
body of individuals designated by the agency
head, by the agency's rules, or by statute to
conduct an adjudicative proceeding.
Section 63-46b-2(h) further provides:
(ii) If fairness to the parties is not
compromised, an agency may substitute one
presiding officer for another during any
proceeding;
(iii) A person who acrs as a presiding
Gi.iiC6r au. one px^ase Ci. a proceeding nccu nc*»
continue as the presiding officer during all
phases of the proceeding.
The just-quoted statutes provide some guidance and limitations
regarding who can serve as presiding officers.

See Comments of

Utah Administrative Law Advisory Committee on the Drafting and
Interpretation of the UAPA (Code Co. at 11).

Section 63-46b-

2(h)(ii) and (iii) jointly operate to provide that different
individuals or entities may act as the presiding officer with
3

respect to a given phase of a proceeding and, significantly, it
is not necessary any given presiding officer during an earlier
stage of a proceeding continue as the presiding officer
throughout the latter stages of the proceeding.
Section 13-1-8.5(1) provides the Department of Commerce and
its various divisions shall comply with the UAPA in their
adjudicative proceedings.

Section 13-1-1 provides the Department

may employ administrative law judges to conduct hearings before
the Department.

Prior to January 1, 1988, Section 13-1-12

stated:
(1) The administrative law judge or an
occupational board or representative
committee, with assistance from the
administrative law judge, shall render a
written recommendation of administrative
action, supported by findings of fact and
conclusions of law . . .
Section 13-1-12 now provides:
(1)(a) At the close of an adjudicative
proceeding, the administrative law judge or
an occupational board or representative
committee with assistance from the
administrative law judge, shall issue an
order.
Section 58-1-1 et seq. both establishs and generally governs
the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing.

Section

58-1-16(1)(a) expressly provides the Division shall comply with
the UAPA in all disciplinary licensure proceedings.

Prior to

January 1, 1988, Section 58-1-16 stated as follows:
(1)(a) Before suspending, revoking, or
refusing to renew a license, and before
issuing a cease and desist order, the divison
shall notify the licensee or license
applicant of the action by letter deposited
in the post office with postage prepaid
4

addressed to the last address of the licensee
or license applicant known to the division,
that the action is being considered and that
the division will provide the licensee or
license applicant with a formal hearing
before an appropriate hearing officer or
board, as designated bv the director.
Section 58-1-16(2) further stated:
All hearings provided under this section
shall be held before an appropriate hearing
officer or board, as designated bv the
director, pursuant to Chapter 1, Title 13.
The board or hearing officer shall render a
written recommendation supported by the
findings of fact and conclusions of law made
at the hearing together with a recommendation
for action. The director, with the
concurrence of the appropriate board, may
issue a written order based on the
recommendations but is not bound to follow
the recommendations of the administrative law
judge or the hearing officer. The written
order of the director shall include the
rationale and justification for the decision.
If the director does not issue an order
within 10 days after the administrative law
judge or the hearing officer has made the
recommendations, the recommendations shall be
binding on the parties to the administrative
action.
Section 58-1-16 was amended, effective January 1, 1988.
statute now provides:
(a)

All adjudicative proceedings shall be

as designated by the director;
(b) The presiding officer shall make
written recommendations for action, findings
of fact, and conclusions of law;
(c) The director, with the concurrence of
the appropriate board, may issue a written
order based on the recommendations but is not
bound to follow the recommendations of the
presiding officer;
(d) If the director does not issue an
order within ten days after the presiding

5

That

officer has made the recommendations, the
recommendations of the presiding officer
shall become the order•
Section 58-7-2(6) specifically governs possible entry of a
disciplinary sanction with respect to an individual licensed to
practice dentistry.

That statute provides:

The division, upon recommendation of the
board, may suspend or revoke the license of a
dentist or dental hygienist for
unprofessional conduct and may reinstate such
license.
Prior to January 1, 1988, Section 58-1-16 provided for a
hearing before "an appropriate hearing officer or board" and
recognized that either the board or the hearing officer was
authorized to render a written recommendation.

Subsequent

amendments to Section 58-1-16 now generally provide that
adjudicative proceedings amy be held before "an appropriate
presiding officer".

The statute, as amended, reflects no

legislative intent that the presiding officer could not be either
an appropriate hearing officer or the board.
Prior to January l, 1988, Section 13-1-12 authorized either
an administrative law judge, or an occupational board or
representative committee with assistance from the administrative
law judge, to issue findings of fact, conclusions of law and a
recommendation for action. Although that statute was
subsequently amended, it still authorizes either the
administrative law judge, or the board or committee with
assistance from the administrative law judge, to issue a order at
the close of an adjudicative proceeding (i.e. after the
conclusion of a hearing).
6

The Court takes notice of the fact that the Division's
practice has been to to designate an administrative law judge as
presiding officer for the purposes of ruling on questions of law
and procedure and to also designate the appropriate board of the
specific licensed profession to enter findings of fact,
conclusions of law and a recommendation•

Such has consistently

been the prevailing agency practice, both prior to and after the
1988 amendments to Section 58-1-16 and Section 13-1-12.

It

appears that practice has been employed to utilize the respective
expertise of an administrative law judge, consistent with the
provisions of Section 13-1-11, as well as the recognized
expertise of the various boards set forth in Title 58.
To the extent the term "presiding officer" - used in Section
58-1-16 - is ambiguous, a reasonable administrative
interpretation and practice should be given some weight.

Salt

Lake City v. Salt Lake County, Utah, 568 P.2d 738 (1977); Cannon
v. Gardner, Utah, 611 P.2d 1207 (1980).

Given the reasonable

administrative interpretation of - and practice under - the
statutes in question, the Court concludes the instant
adjudicative proceeding may properly be conducted in a similar
manner and the August 17, 1989 notice failed to accurately
identify that procedure.
Thus, supplemental notice is now provided that the Board
will act as the presiding officer in this proceeding to thus
render a written recommended order, supported by the findings of
fact and conclusions of law.

Consistent with Section 13-1-

12(1)(a), further notice is now provided the administrative law
7

judge will assist the Board in preparing that order for its
issuance. Consistent with Section 13-1-11 and the long standing
practice in professional disciplinary licensure hearings, notice
is further provided the administrative law judge will rule on
questions of law and procedure which may arise, both prior to and
during the hearing.
One further matter should be addressed.

The Court notes

Respondents previously filed a June 20, 1991 motion to recuse
David E. Robinson from participating in this proceeding.
Further, the Division has filed a March 10, 1992 notice, whereby
Mr. Robinson has recused himself in that regard.

Pursuant to

Section 58-1-16, Mr. Robinson could have been otherwise
authorized to act as the presiding officer as to any findings of
fact, conclusions of law and recommended order entered by the
Board.
This Court's March 19, 1992 Scheduling Order indicated oral
argument could be presented as to whether any recommended order
submittted by the Board may properly be subject to review and
subsequent action by David L. Buhler, Executive Director of the
Department of Commerce.

The UAPA is silent as to both any

procedure which governs possible recusal of a presiding officer
and the consequences of any such recusal. However, Section 13-112(2) provides as follows:
If a division director is unable for any
reason to fairly review or rule upon an order
of the administrative law judge or a board or
committee, the executive director shall
review and rule upon the order.
Given the language of the just-quoted statute, it would appear
8

David L. Buhler is thus authorized to rule on any findings of
fact, conclusions of law and recommended order subsequently
entered by the Board in this proceeding.

The Court will contact

respective counsel on April 13, 1992 to identify whether
Respondents anticipate filing any motion to recuse Mr. Buhler
from participation in this proceeding.
ORDER
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the Dentists and Dental
Hygienists Board shall act as the presiding officer in this
proceeding to render a written recommended order, supported by
findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Further, the

administrative law judge will assist the Board in preparing that
order for its issuance and the administrative law judge shall
rule on all questions of law and procedure which may arise during
the pendency of this proceeding.
It is further ordered that any motion to recuse David L.
Buhler from participation in this proceeding shall be filed
within ten (10) days after the Court has conducted a conference
call with respective counsel to determine whether any such motion
^2

2.,*^^"^/^^*^p^o^

Dated this

r

f&*~

day of

April,

1992

J.WSteven (Eklund
Administrative Law Judge
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BEFORE THE DIVISION OP OCCUPATIONAL 6 PROFESSIONAL LICENSING
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSES OF
KENT BLAINE HANSEN AND
BRENT D. HANSEN
TO PRACTICE AS DENTISTS
AND TO PRESCRIBE AND ADMINISTER
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES
IN THE STATE OF UTAH

:
ORDER ON DIVISION'S
MOTION IN LIMINE
:
::
J
:

CASE NO. OPL-89-47

Appearances:
Robert E. Steed for the Division of Occupational and
Professional Licensing
Jackson Howard and Leslie W. Slaugh for Respondents
BY THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE:
By motion, dated June 14, 1991, the Division seeks to
exclude certain evidence in the hearing to be conducted before
the Dentists and Dental Hygienists Board in the above-entitled
matter.

Specifically, the Division urges: (1) evidence

concerning K.W.'s prior sexual history and general reputation
should be excluded; and (2) evidence of that nature as to other
witnesses similarly situated should also be excluded.
Respondents filed a response to the just-described motion on
July 1, 1991 and the Division's reply was filed July 2, 1991.
Oral argument was conducted April 1, 1992 before J. Steven
Eklund, Administrative Law Judge for the Department of Commerce,
and the matter was taken under advisement.
The Court, now being fully advised in the premises, enters
the following:

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Division contends none of the above-referenced evidence
is relevant as to whether Respondents engaged in unprofessional
conduct, as alleged in the August 17, 1989 Petition.

The

Division further asserts the evidence should be excluded because
its probative value - if any - is substantially- outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, such evidence would confuse the
issues and "drag out details of K.W.'s private life for no
legitimate reason or purpose".
Respondents note Count I of the petition, which contains an
allegation they took "sexual liberties" with certain patients.
Respondents urge that allegation places the sexual activity of
the supposed victims at issue, the Board must determine whether
the actions allegedly taken were "liberties" or "invited
responses" and evidence of the supposed victim's consent is thus
relevant.
Respondents also contend K.W.'s past sexual conduct
demonstrates her propensity to brazenly pursue sexual relations,
the conduct which allegedly occurred between her and Respondents
was prompted by her aggressive suggestion and the alleged conduct
thus reflects an isolated incident not indicative of any public
threat.

Respondents thus assert evidence of K.W.'s consenting

participation is a relevant mitigating factor to be considered by
the Board as to any disciplinary sanction which may be warranted
in this proceeding.
Section 63-46b-8 of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act
(hereinafter, the UAPA) provides:
2

(1) . . . in all formal adjudicative
proceedings, a hearing shall be conducted as
follows:
(a) The presiding officer shall
regulate the course of the hearing
to obtain full disclosure of
relevant facts and to avoid all the
parties reasonable opportunity to
present their positions.
(b) On his own motion or upon
objection by a party, the presiding
officer:
(i) may exclude
evidence that is
irrelevant, immaterial,
or unduly repetitous . .
Comments of the Utah Administative Law Advisory Committee on the
drafting and interpretation of the UAPA reflect as follows:
The intent of the Advisory Committee was
that the grant of authority to the presiding
officer found in Section 63-46b-8(1)(a)
should be broadly construed. (Code Co. 1988
at 13-14) .
The above-quoted statute does not expressly make the Utah Rules
of Evidence applicable in formal adjudicative proceedings.
However, Section 63-46b-8(1)(b)(i) allows a presiding officer to
exclude irrelevant evidence.

Instructively, Rule 401 of the Utah

Rules of Evidence defines relevant evidence as:
. . . evidence having any tendency to make
the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the
action more probable or less probable than it
would be without the evidence.
Rule 403 generally provides that relevant evidence "may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues or
misleading the jury . • ."
The evidence which is the subject of this pending motion
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specifically involves Rule 404, which states:
(a) Evidence of a person7s character or a
trait of his character is not admissible for
the purpose of proving that he acted in
conformity therewith on a particular
occasion, except:
(3) Evidence of the character of
a witness, as provided in Rules
607, 608 and 609.
Rule 608 governs evidence offered concerning the character and
conduct of a witness as follows:
(b) Specific instances of the conduct of a
witness, for the purpose of attacking or
supporting his credibility, other than
conviction of a crime as provided in Rule
609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence.
They may, however, in the discretion of the
court, if probative of truthfulness or
untruthfulness, be inquired into on crossexamination of the witness (1) concerning his
character for truthfulness or untruthfulness
or (2) concerning the character for
truthfulness or untruthfulness of another
witness as to which character the witness
being cross-examined has testified.
During oral argument on the pending motion, Respondents
asserted K.W.'s credibility (or that of any other witness) may be
assailed by evidence of the prior sexual history or reputation of
that witness.
reasons.

Such assertion is without merit for numerous

First, Rule 608 expressly precludes extrinsic evidence

of that nature for such a purpose.

Further, prior sexual history

of a witness is not probative of the veracity of the witness.

In

State v. Johns, 615 P.2d 1260, 1264 (Utah 1980), the Utah Supreme
Court stated as follows:
Because the law does not and should not
recognize any connection between the veracity
of a witness and her sexual promiscuity, the
4

proposed evidence has no relevancy in regard
to the truthfulness of her testimony . . ..
Such evidence, if offered to attack the credibility of a witness,
should be particularly excluded because "its primary purpose and
effect" would be to "cast aspersions" on the witness and
"besmirch her character" in the eyes of the Board.

See Bullock

v. Ungricht. 538 P.2d 190, 192 (Utah 1975).
The remaining issue is whether the evidence in question is
admissible regarding K.W.'s possible consent (or that of any
other patient) to the alleged conduct of either of the
Respondents.

In State v. Johns, supra, the Court stated:

. . . in cases involving forcible rape or
aggravated sexual assault, the fact a woman
has consented to sexual activity in the past
under different circumstances and with
individuals other than the defendant has
little if any relevancy to the question of
her consent and the situation involved here.
However, . . . there are some cases in
which the reputation of the prosecutrix and
in which specific prior sexual activity mav
become relevant and its probative value
outweighs the detrimental impact of its
introduction. Id. at 1263-64.
The Court thus set forth the following test:
While the balancing of the probative value
of the evidence and its detrimental effect is
entrusted to the discretion of the trial
judge, in the usual case such evidence,
either of general reputation or specific
prior acts, is simply not relevant to anv
issue in the rape prosecution including the
consent of the prosecutrix. Such evidence is
admissible only when the court finds under
the circumstances of the particular case such
evidence is relevant to a material factual
dispute and its probative value outweighs the
inherent danger of unfair prejudice to the
prosecutrix, confusion of issues, unwarranted
invasion of the complaintant's privacy,
consideration of undue delay and time waste,
5

and the needless presentation of cumulative
evidence. Id at 1264. (Emphasis added.)
Although this is not a criminal proceeding, the just-stated
principles are persuasive and should also be applied in this
case.
Evidence of consensual participation by a patient with
respect to unprofessional conduct allegedly undertaken by either
of the Respondents has significant probative value as to both the
circumstances which may have prompted whatever occurred between
Respondents and a given patient and the nature of any
disciplinary sanction which should enter if unprofessional
conduct is found to have occurred.

The Utah Court of Appeals has

recognized the vital function of cross-examination in
professional licensure disciplinary proceedings. D.B. v. Division
of Occupational and Professional Licensing, 779 P.2d 1145, 1147
(1989).

Respondents may thus cross-examine any given patient

concerning the specific circumstances of this case and the
possible existence of the above-referenced mitigating factor.
Further, evidence of a patient's prior consensual sexual
behavior with a licensed health care professional within the
context of a physician/patient relationship has some probative
valuie, insofar as it relates to the issue of consensual
participation of that patient in this case. Within the juststated constraints, Respondents may cross-examine such a witness
in this proceeding as to that matter.
However, any evidence of a witness' general prior sexual
history or reputation should be excluded for various reasons.
6

The right to cross-examine a witness "does not entail the right
to harrass, annoy or humiliate [a] witness on cross-examination".
State v. Chestnut, 621 P.2d 1228, 1233 (Utah 1980), quoting Evans
v. Alaska. 550 P.2d 830, 837 (Alaska 1976).

Character evidence

of prior sexual behavior is often of "slight probative value, is
very prejudicial and may confuse the issues at trial". State v.
Moton, 749 P.2d 639, 644 (Utah 1988).

As that Court further

stated:
One of the trial judge's duties is to
regulate the admission of character evidence
so as to exclude evidence which tends to
distract the trier of fact from the main
question of what actually happened on a
particular occasion- This process prevents
the trier of fact from rewarding one
individual and punishing another because of
their respective characters, instead of
focusing upon the evidence in the case. Id.
Given the foregoing, the Court necessarily concludes any
evidence of a witness' prior sexual history or reputation beyond the limited scope of cross-examination identified herein would unduly subject either K.W. or another witness similarly
situated to humiliation and constitute an unwarranted invasion of
their privacy.

The degree of unfair prejudice which would result

is thus clear.
Importantly, such evidence would also tend to confuse the
issues and mislead the Board by shifting what should be the
predominant focus of this proceeding (i.e., the nature of
whatever conduct occurred between Respondents and K.W. or other
patients) to the myriad relationships which existed or conduct
which occurred regarding any given patient and a third party.
7

Further, if any extrinsic evidence of that nature were allowed,
it would also require the Board to assess the credibility of the
various witnesses who testify regarding those relationships.
Such would be particularly indirect and potentially fruitless
process with respect to the Board's primary charge, which is to
determine the nature of Respondents7 conduct with respect to K.W.
or other patients.
Respondents urge the Board is more capable than a common
jury of assessing the evidence sought to be admitted and such
evidence should thus be allowed, even though of minimal probative
value, because a lesser risk of undue prejudice exists in this
administrative setting.

The Court is not persuaded Rule 4 03 is

any less applicable in this adjudicative proceeding than it would
be in a criminal or civil action.

Simply put, the initial and

continuing focus of this proceeding should be directed toward
whatever conduct was undertaken by either Respondent with respect
to those individuals referenced in the petition, the
circumstances which prompted whatever may have occurred, whether
any basis exists to impose a disciplinary sanction as to either
Respondent and the nature of any sanction which is warranted.
Given the disposition of the pending motion, Respondents
will thus be allowed to present and support their theory of the
case, subject to restrictions which are necessary to ensure the
evidence received in this proceeding is admitted within the
proper scope of those issues to be addressed by the Board.
ORDER
Evidence of consensual participation by K.W. or another
8

patient with respect to unprofessional conduct allegedly
undertaken by either of the Respondents is admissible in this
proceeding.

Respondents may thus cross-examine those witnesses

concerning those circumstances in an attempt to establish the
existence of such a mitigating factor.
Further, evidence of K.W.'s or another witness' prior sexual
behavior with a licensed health care professional within the
context of a physician/patient relationship shall be also
admissible, both on cross-examination of that witness and for
possible impeachment purposes on rebuttal.
However, evidence of K.W.'s or another witness' general
prior sexual history or reputation shall be excluded for the
reasons set forth herein.
Dated this

day of April, 1992

Steven /Eklund
ajdtil i n i s t r a t i v e Law Judge
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BEFORE THE DIVISION OP OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING
OF TEE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE 8TATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSES OF
KENT BLAINE HANSEN AND
BRENT D. HANSEN
TO PRACTICE AS DENTISTS
AND TO PRESCRIBE AND ADMINISTER
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES
IN THE STATE OF UTAH

!
ORDER ON APPLICABLE
STANDARD OF PROOF
:
::
:

CASE NO. OPL-89-47

Appearances:
Robert E. Steed for the Division of Occupational and
Professional Licensing
Jackson Howard and Leslie W. Slaugh for Respondents
BY THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE:
The instant adjudicative proceeding was initiated pursuant
to an August 17, 1989 notice of agency action.

Sparing detail,

Respondents filed a motion to dismiss on April 30, 1991 and oral
argument was conducted on May 23, 1991. Prior to the conclusion
of oral argument, counsel for Respondents made inquiry regarding
the standard of proof which would govern any subsequent hearing
conducted to address whether a disciplinary sanction should enter
as to Respondents' licenses.
The Court thus requested both parties to submit memoranda as
to that matter.

The Division filed its brief on June 11, 1991,

Respondents filed their memorandum on June 21, 1991 and the
Division's final reply was filed July 1, 1991. Oral argument was
subsequently conducted April 1, 1992 and the Court took the
matter under advisement.

The Administrative Law Judge, now being fully advised in the
premises, enters the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Respondents contend the applicable standard of proof in
this proceeding should be clear and convincing evidence•
Specifically, Respondents urge this proceeding -is quasi-criminal
in nature and that the Division seeks to impose a punitive
sanction which would impinge on their constitutionally protected
rights.

Respondents also assert Utah courts have required clear

and convincing proof in a civil contempt case and such a case is
"strikingly similar" to this professional licensure disciplinary
proceeding.

Given both the nature of this proceeding and

Respondents' respective interests in maintaining their ability to
practice their chosen profession, they contend the Division
should be required to prove its case by clear and convincing
evidence.
The Division asserts Utah courts adhere to the general rule
that the standard of proof in administrative proceedings is a
preponderance of the evidence.

The Division notes there is no

statutorily established standard of proof which governs the
instant proceeding and many other courts in other states have
utilized the preponderance standard in professional licensure
disciplinary proceedings.
In Rogers v. Division of Real Estate, 790 P.2d 102 (Utah
1990), the Utah Court of Appeals described a professional
licensure disciplinary proceeding as:
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. . . a special, somewhat unique, statutory
proceeding, in which the disciplinary board
investigates the conduct of a member of the
profession to determine if disciplinary
action is appropriate to maintain sound
professional standards of conduct and protect
the public. Id. at 105-06.
The Utah Court of Appeals has also recognized that a person
lf

whose freedom to pursue his profession is seriously restricted

by an official action . . . may compel the government to afford
him a hearing complying with the traditional requirements of due
process" • D.B. v. Division of Occupational and Professional
Licensing. 779 P.2d 1145, 1146 (Utah App. 1989), quoting Endler
v. Schutzbank, 68 Cal.2d 162, 436 P.2d 297, 304 (1968).

No statute exists which establishes the standard of proof
applicable in this proceeding.

The Utah Administrative

Procedures Act (Sections 63-46b-l et seq., hereinafter, the
UAPA), those statutes governing the Department of Commerce
(Sections 13-1-1 et seq.) and the Division of Occupational and
Professional Licensing (Sections 58-1-1 et seq.) are all silent
in that regard, although Section 63-46b-16(4)(g) of the UAPA
provides the standard on judicial review as "substantial evidence
when viewed in light of the whole record before the court".
Further, Utah courts have not specifically addressed the
appropriate standard of proof in professional licensure
disciplinary proceedings initiated by the Division.

Thus, the

issue presented should be resolved based on a review of analogous
cases decided by the courts of this state and the more persuasive
decisions rendered by courts in other states.
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that driver license
3

revocation proceedings are not necessarily "criminal" or "quasicriminal" in nature,

Ballard v. State Motor Vehicle Division,

595 P.2d 1302, 1304 (Utah 1979).

In Ward v. Smith. 573 P.2d 781

(Utah 1978), the Court held a parole revocation hearing was an
administrative, rather than a criminal, proceeding.

Id. at 782.

See also Johns v. Shulsen. 717 P.2d 1336 (Utah -1986) ; Walker v.
Board of Pardons, 803 P.2d 1241 (Utah 1990).
In further contrast to prosecutions under criminal statutes,
the Utah Supreme Court has acknowledged that a driver license
revocation proceeding "requires proof only by a preponderance of
the evidence and not beyond a reasonable doubt".
Schwendiman, 645 P.2d 651, 652 (Utah 1982).

Garcia v.

The preponderance

standard also applies in a parole revocation proceeding.

Johns

v, Shulsen, supra, at 13 38; Walker v. Board of Pardons, supra.
Respondents contend their respective interests in the
continuation of their livelihood are deserving of more protection
than that afforded a motorist merely faced with the loss of
driving privileges or a parolee who might lose their conditional
freedom.

Even assuming Respondents are correct, many courts in

sister states have applied the preponderance standard of proof in
professional licensure disciplinary proceedings.

Rucker v.

Michigan Board of Medicine, 138 Mich. App. 209, 360 N.W.2d 154,
155 (1984);

In re Schultz. 375 N.W.2d 509, 514 (Minn. App.

1985); Forster v. Board, 103 N.W. 776, 714 P.2d 580, 582 (1986);
Eaves v. Board of Medical Examiners, 467 N.W.2d 234, 237 (Iowa
1991).
Other courts have utilized a clear and convincing evidence
4

test. Ettinaer v. Board of hedical Quality Assurance. 185
Cal.Rptr. 601, 603 (1982); In re Zar, 434 N.W.2d 598r 602 (S.D.
1989).

In Hoaan v. Mississippi Board of Nursing. 457 So.2d 931

(Miss. 1984), the Court characterized a license revocation
proceeding as "penal" in nature and thus required proof by clear
and convincing evidence. Id. at 934. The South-Dakota Supreme
Court has emphasized a higher standard of proof should apply in
such a proceeding due to the interest involved (i.e., a
professional's career), stating:
The revocation of a license of a
professional [person] carries with it dire
consequences. It not only involves
necessarily disgrace and humiliation, but it
means the end of [his or her] professional
career.
In re Zar, supra.
However, a professional licensure disciplinary hearing is
not a criminal proceeding in nature.

See Rogers v. Division of

Real Estate, supra, and cases cited herein.

Concededly,

Respondents' respective interests in maintaining their
professional livelihood and the possible deprivation of that
ability as a result of this proceeding are substantial.
Polk. 90 N.J. 550, 449 A.2d 7, 14 (1982).

In re

Nevertheless, this

Court seriously questions Respondents' implicit suggestion that a
license to practice dentistry represents a fundamental
constitutional right.

The New Jersey Court squarely rejected a

similar contention in the case of In re Polk, supra,
instructively stating as follows:
A license to practice a profession is not a
basic individual right. While it embraces a
5

substantial individual interest which
deserves abundant protection, it cannot be
equated with a fundamental right, the
reasonable regulation of which can be
measured and justified only by a compelling
state interest. The right to practice
medicine itself is granted in the interest of
the public and is "always subject to
reasonable regulation in the public
interest." Id. at 17 (Citation omitted).
In its persuasive and well reasoned decision, the Court further
recognized the government's "paramount obligation to protect the
general health of the public" and the right of physicians to
practice their profession as being "necessarily subordinate to
this governmental interest". Id at 14.

Significantly, the Court

concluded:
We are satisfied that the preponderance of
the evidence burden of proof is sufficient
for purposes of an administrative
adjudication concerning professional guilt
and discipline against a licensed medical
doctor. In view of the subject matter of
such proceedings, the nature of the evidence,
the qualifications of witnesses, the special
expertise of the tribunal, the relative
advantages and resources of the parties, and
the minimal risk of inaccurate or erroneous
factfinding and final decisionmaking,
confidence in a final adjudication would not
be imperiled by employing the preponderance
of the evidence standard. These proceedings
do not demand an enhanced burden of proof.
Id. at 16. (All emphasis herein added).
The Utah Supreme Court has frequently addressed the standard
of proof applicable in an attorney disciplinary proceeding.

In

the early case of In re Hanson, 48 Utah 163, 158 P. 778 (1916),
the Court commented that evidence in such a proceeding "should be
clear and convincing" and such a rule "is based upon a most solid
foundation". Id at 779. The Court later recognized the
6

applicable test as being a "clear preponderance of the evidence".
In re Barclay, 82 Utah 288, 24 P.2d 302, 305 (1933).
In a subsequent case, the Court stated that charges in an
attorney disciplinary proceeding "should be clearly sustained by
convincing proof and a fair preponderance of the evidence".

In

re McCullouah. 97 Utah 533, 95 P.2d 13 (1939). -More recently,
the Court has stated as follows:
-We agree that because of the seriousness of
the consequences to the attorney involved
touching upon the important right to follow
his vocation and make a livelihood, that such
is the established rule (i.e., the persuasion
of his misconduct must be by clear and
convincing evidence).
In re MacFarlane. 10 Utah 2d 217, 350 P.2d 631, 633 (1960).

The

somewhat misleading phrase "clear preponderance", as used by the
Court in the case of In re Barclay, supra, has been defined by
the Washington Supreme Court as follows:
"Clear preponderance" is an intermediate
standard of proof in these cases, requiring
greater certainty than "simple preponderance"
but not to the extent required under "beyond
reasonable doubt". This intermediate
standard reflects the unique character of
disciplinary proceedings. The standard of
proof is higher than the simple preponderance
normally required in civil actions because
the stigma associated with disciplinary
action is generally greater than that
associated with most tort and contract cases.
Yet because the interests in protecting the
public, maintaining confidence, and
preserving the integrity of the legal
profession also weigh heavily in these
proceedings, the standard of proof is
somewhat lower than the beyond reasonable
doubt standard required in criminal
prosecutions.
In re Allotta. 109 Wash.2d 787, 748 P.2d 628, 630-31 (1988).
7

Respondents thus suggest the enhanced standard of proof in
attorney disciplinary proceedings should also be applicable in
professional disciplinary licensure proceedings initiated by the
Division.

Since the underlying purpose of disciplining both

attorneys and physicians is protection of the public, one court
has recognized the same enhanced standard should apply to a
practitioner of either profession.

Ettinaer v. Board of Medical

Quality Assurance, supra.
However, the New Jersey Surpeme Court has acknowledged a
f,

less stringent burden of proof" can be rationally applied in

medical licensure proceedings "as more protective of society's
important interest in individual life and health". In re Polk,
supra, at 18. Further, the Iowa Supreme Court has upheld
dissimilar standards of proof as between those professions "where
the regulations being compared have been established by differing
branches of government". Eaves v. Board of Medical Quality
Examiners. supra.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has addressed the same issue and
applied the preponderance standard of proof in a dental licensure
disciplinary proceeding, stating:
We note the burden of proof in attorney
disciplinary cases is clear and convincing
evidence. Attorney disciplinary proceedings,
under the supervision and control of the
judiciary, are sui generis. Attorney
misconduct, striking as it does, at the
administration of our justice system, gives
society a heightened interest in the outcome
of attorney discipline. A higher standard of
proof is indicated. (All citations omitted).
In re Wang, 441 N.W.2d 488, 492 (1989).
8

The Court nevertheless

recognized the nature of the proceeding and appropriately
provided the following caution:
. . . these proceedings brought on behalf
of the state, attacking a person's
professional and personal reputation and
character and seeking to impose disciplinary
sanctions, are no ordinary proceedings. We
trust that in all professional disciplinary
matters, the finder of fact, bearing in mind
the gravity of the decision to be made, will
be persuaded only by evidence with heft. The
reputation of a profession and the reputation
of a professional as well as the public trust
are at stake. Id.
Respondents cite other cases decided by the courts of this
state where a clear and convincing standard of proof was applied.
Wvcoff Co. v. Public Service Commission, 13 Utah 2d 123, 369 P.2d
283 (1962); Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1988).
However, neither of those cases involved a disciplinary sanction
with respect to a professional license.

Since those cases are

distinctly different in nature from this proceeding, the
principles set forth therein provide no meaningful guidance for
purposes of the matter now under review.

Further, this tribunal

has previously concluded the standard of proof which should apply
in professional disciplinary licensure proceedings initiated by
the Division is a preponderance of the evidence.

In re Barney

(Case No. OPL-91-69, filed August 2, 1991).
Based on the foregoing, a considered review of existing case
law and the arguments presented by both parties, this Court is
not persuaded the standard of proof previously applied in
professional disciplinary licensure proceedings initiated by the
Division should be abandoned.

The Court further concludes the
9

clear and convincing standard of proof applied in attorney
disciplinary proceedings in this state should not be extended as
to govern this proceeding,
ORDER
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED the standard of proof in this
professional licensure disciplinary proceeding shall be a
preponderance of the evidence.
Dated this _ j ^ ^ T day of April, 1992

J .W Steven"] Eklund
Administrative Law Judge
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

KENT BLAINE HANSEN and BRENT D.
HANSEN,

PETITION FOR REVIEW OR, IN THE
ALTERNATIVE, FOR
EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF

Petitioners,
Case No. OPL-89-47
vs.
DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL AND
PROFESSIONAL LICENSING,
Respondent.

Kent Blaine Hansen and Brent D. Hansen, hereby petition the Utah Court of Appeals
to permit an appeal from the interlocutory orders of the Honorable J. Steven Ecklund entered
in this matter on the following dates:
1.

Order on Procedures Governing Disposition of Respondents' Motion To Close

Hearing, dated April 7, 1992.
2.

Order on Respondents' Motion to Close Hearing, dated April 7, 1992.

3.

Supplemental Notice and Accompanying Order, dated April 7, 1992.

4.

Order on Division's Motion in Limine, dated April 17, 1992.

5.

Order on Applicable Standard of Proof, dated April 17, 1992.

A copy of the orders sought to be reviewed are attached, as is a brief memorandum
explaining the jurisdictional basis for this petition for review.
PERSONS SUBSTANTIALLY AFFECTED
Petitioners Kent Blaine Hansen and Brent D. Hansen are the only persons substantially
affected by these orders of the Division, although such orders, to the extent that they represent
ongoing and established procedures of the Division, may affect all persons against whom actions
are brought by the Division.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On August 17, 1989, the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing of the
Department of Commerce of the State of Utah filed a Notice of Agency Action against
petitioners Kent Blaine Hansen and Brent D. Hansen. The Notice of Agency Action sought to
suspend or revoke petitioners' dental licenses for unprofessional conduct under the provisions
of Utah Code Ann. § 58-7-2(6). Among other things, the Notice alleged that petitioners had
violated the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 58-7-1.l(7)(k), (1), (q) and (r) by, among other
things, the taking of lewd nude photographs of K.W., a patient, and performing unnecessary
treatments in order to exchange drugs for K.W.'s sexual favors. The Notice also indicated that

the presiding officer would be J. Steven Ecklund, Administrative Law Judge for the Department
of Commerce.
On April 30, 1991 respondents filed a motion to dismiss this action. On May 23,
1991, the Division heard oral arguments on this motion. As a result, it made a preliminary
order as to the identity of the presiding officer.

On April 1, 1992, in oral argument,

respondents requested a clarification of the identity of the presiding officer. On April 7, 1992,
Judge Ecklund filed a Supplemental Notice and Accompanying Order which stated that the
Board of Dentists and Dental Hygienists would act as the presiding officer in the hearing to
determine factual issues and rendering a written recommended order, and that the administrative
law judge would act as the presiding officer regarding legal issues and would assist the Board
in preparing that order.
On June 20, 1991, petitioners filed a motion to close the hearing on the matter to all
members of the press and public. On July 1, 1991, the Division filed an opposing memorandum. The Salt Lake City Tribune filed a petition to intervene in this motion. On July 2, 1991,
the Division granted the Tribune's motion to intervene, and on July 3, 1991, the Tribune filed
its memorandum in opposition to petitioners' motion. On July 9 and 10, 1991, petitioners
filed replies to the submissions of the Division and the Tribune. Oral argument on this motion
was heard on April 1, 1992 by Judge Ecklund. On April 7, 1991, he ordered that petitioners'
motion to close the hearing be conducted before the Board and that the hearing was governed
by the Open and Public Meetings Act because the Board, rather than the Administrative Law
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Judge was the presiding officer authorized to enter findings of fact, conclusions of law and a
recommended order subsequent to any hearing on the merits. He also denied petitioners'
motion to close the hearing, ordering that the hearing be open to the press and public.
On June 14, 1991, the Division filed a motion seeking to exclude certain evidence,
including: (1) K.W/s prior sexual history and general reputation, and (2) evidence of that
nature as to similarly situated witnesses. Petitioners filed a response to this motion on July
1, 1991. On July 2, 1991, the Division filed a reply memorandum. Judge Ecklund heard
oral argument on this motion on April 1, 1992. He ordered that evidence of K.W.'s and other
witnesses' general prior sexual history or reputation shall be excluded from the proceeding on
April 17, 1992.
On June 11, 1991, the Division filed a brief on the issue of the standard of proof which
should govern a hearing on the merits of the action. Petitioners filed a response on June 21,
1991, to which the Division replied on July 1, 1991. Judge Ecklund also heard this motion on
April 1, 1992. Following the oral argument, on April 17, 1992, he ordered that the standard
of proof for professional licensure proceedings initiated by the Division of Occupational and
Professional Licensing is the preponderance of the evidence rather than clear and convincing
evidence.
Petitioners bring this Petition to appeal from all of these orders.
QUESTIONS OF LAW

1.

Did the Administrative Law Judge err in ordering that the Board would act as

presiding officer for the purpose of making findings of fact and conclusions of law and, at the
same time in the same proceeding, that the Administrative Law Judge would be the presiding
officer for purposes of ruling on questions of law and procedure?
2.

Did the Administrative Law Judge err in denying petitioners' motion to close

the hearing and in ordering that the hearing be open to the press and public?
3.

Did the Administrative Law Judge en in ordering that petitioners' motion to

close the proceedings to the public and press was governed by the Open and Public Meetings
Act because the finder of fact in the present action was the Board rather than the Administrative
Law Judge?
4.

Did the Administrative Law Judge err in ordering that the evidence of K.W.'s

and other witnesses' general prior sexual history be excluded from the proceeding?
5.

Did the Administrative Law Judge err in determining that the standard of proof

for professional licensing proceedings initiated by the Division of Occupational and Professional
Licensing is the preponderance of the evidence rather than clear and convincing evidence?
Petitioners seek, for relief, the resolution of these issues.
ISSUES RAISED BEFORE THE AGENCY
The factual recitation above indicates that each of these issues was briefed and argued
before the Division of Professional Licensing, and that the Administrative Law Judge considered
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each of these issues and issued separate orders on them. Copies of each of these orders are
attached to this Petition.
IMMEDIATE APPEAL NECESSARY
Immediate appeal from these orders is necessary because petitioners will be irreparably
harmed if they are forced to continue litigating this matter under these orders in order to obtain
a final judgment. The major harm which will, in all probability, ensue should this petition be
denied and petitioners be forced to continue litigation under the present orders is the complete,
total and irreparable damage to their personal and professional reputations resulting from an
open and public hearing on the merits of the case. Because of the extremely controversial and
inflammatory nature of the charges made by the Division against petitioners and the highly
prejudicial nature of the evidence which might be introduced, petitioners, even if they were
ultimately cleared of the Division's charges, would likely lose their dental practices and personal
reputations as a consequence of extensive publicity in this matter. That any hearing on the
merits will be highly publicized by the press and other media is extremely likely. The Salt
Lake Tribune has already intervened in opposition to petitioners' motion to close the
proceedings. K.W., one of the more controversial witnesses for the Division, has already
appeared on local and national television and made statements about the case, which has already
had serious repercussions for petitionen. Should this matter become a "media event," the
ensuing trouble and loss of reputation for petitioners will be uncontainable and incalculable.
For this reason, an interlocutory appeal on this order is critical to the administration of justice.

Petitioners should not be tried and convicted in the media, as they will almost assuredly be, but
the issue should be adjudicated within the non-public confines of the appropriate, legislatively
established tribunal.
The issue of the identity of the presiding officer, similarly, needs immediate attention;
the Division is only able to justify the application of the Open and Public Meetings Act to the
present proceeding because of its order making the Board, rather than the Administrative Law
Judge, the trier of fact. The order identifying the presiding officer responsible for factual
findings as the Board is, therefore, the "cause" of the closure problem. If the Administrative
Law Judge were the trier of fact, as the Utah Administrative Procedure Act contemplates, then
the issue of closure of the hearing would possibly not exist. Further, there is substantial chance
that this order, which allows the Division to "switch" presiding officers at will during the
course of this single matter, in contravention of the intent of the Utah Administrative Procedures
Act and other related statutes, will result in substantial arbitrariness and prejudice to petitioners.
Petitioners will also be exposed to substantial prejudice as a result of the remaining
two orders, which prejudice could be avoided should this Court grant their Petition for Review.
Central to petitioners' defense is evidence of K.W.'s reputation for sexual immorality in
general, and her previous, extensive, and ongoing pattern of behavior in seducing other medical
practitionen by means of offering sexual favors in return for controlled substances.

As a

consequence of the Administrative Law Judge's Order excluding evidence of K.W.'s prior
sexual history, petitioners' defense will be substantially impaired. This problem should be
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remedied immediately, not after rendition of a final order, because petitioners will not be able,
under the present order, to even proffer, let alone prove substantial evidence necessary for their
defense, making an incomplete and ineffective record for appeal from the final order.
ADVANCE TERMINATION OF LTITGATTON
Resolution of all four of these issues on an interlocutory appeal will materially advance
the termination of the litigation because all four of them, if not resolved now, will need to be
resolved on an appeal if a final order adverse to petitioners is issued. The likelihood of such
an adverse result is greatly increased by the exclusion of evidence of K.W.'s prior sexual
history, which will deprive petitioners of a substantial and important defense, and the order
determining that the applicable standard of proof is the preponderance of the evidence rather
than clear and convincing evidence. Should an adverse final order issue, petitioners would
appeal these very issues and this Court would consider the appeal. Should this Court find an
abuse of discretion on even one of these orders, the matter would have to be heard again at a
substantial waste of time and expense to all parties concerned, with the additional danger that
memories would have faded and evidence lost. In the context of the present litigation, it would
be in the clear interest of efficiency as well as fairness to grant petitioners' Petition for Review
of these interlocutory orders.
JURISDICTIONAL BASIS
The present Petition for Review arises from four non-final administrative orders. This
petition is, accordingly, brought under two alternative theories of jurisdiction:
8

(1) an

interlocutory appeal under rule 14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and Utah Code
Ann. § 63-46b-14(2)(b) (1991), and (2) an extraordinary writ under rule 65B of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure and rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
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Interlocutory Appeal
Under the new Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA) and the applicable rules
promulgated by the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing, "[a] party aggreived
may obtain judicial review of final agency action . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(l).
Although the UAPA provides substantial rules for review of final administrative orders, see
e.g.. Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-12(l)(a) (1991), 63-46b-13(l)(a) (1991), and 63-46b-14
(1991), there appears to be absolutely no provision for an interlocutory appeal from an
administrative order, except under following language from Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(2)(b)
(1991):
(2) A party may seek judicial review only after exhausting
all administrative remedies available, except that:

(b)

the court may relieve a party seeking judicial review of the

requirement to exhaust any or all administrative remedies if:
(i) the administrative remedies are inadequate; or
(ii) exhaustion of remedies would result in
irreparable harm disproportionate to the public
benefit derived from requiring exhaustion.
Under this language, a party need not exhaust any or all administrative remedies, including
obtaining a final order, in order to seek judicial review of the proceeding if the administrative
remedies are inadequate or the exhaustion of remedies would result in irreparable harm
disproportionate to the public benefit received from exhaustion.
10

Administrative remedies are inadequate in the present case because irreparable harm
will be done to the professional and personal reputations of petitioners, regardless of the
outcome of this proceeding, should the hearings be open to the press and public. Petitioners
will also be damaged by the three other orders, as discussed above, unless afforded immediate
relief. There is no provision in the UAPA or elsewhere that serves to remedy any of these
problems. Consequently, the available administrative remedies are inadequate. The damage
that would be done to the individual petitioners' reputations and ability to defend themselves
from the Division's charges should they not be afforded immediate relief would be devastating
to them, effectively putting them out of business regardless of the ultimate outcome of the
matter. This is, surely, "irreparable harm disproportionate to the public benefit derived from
requiring exhaustion."
Accordingly, this Petition for Review is brought under the applicable provisions of the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, including rule 14, which allows for judicial review by the
Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals "of an order or decision of an administrative agency,
board, commission, committee, or officer." This language does not require that an order
appealed from be a final order, because section 63-46b-14(2)(b) allows an interlocutory appeal
under the present circumstances, this Petition should be granted.
Further, this Petition is brought within 30 days of the date of the first order appealed
from, and supplies the information required in Rule 14. Because this petition is in the nature
of an interlocutory appeal, petitioners, in an effort to assist the Court, have followed the
11

format of a rule 5 petition even though rule 5 is inapplicable to administrative orders under
rule 18.
Extraordinary writ.
Rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows for relief to be granted under
its provisions "where no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy exists/

If this Court

should determine that a Petition for Review under rule 14 is unavailable to petitioners, this
Court should grant review of the orders at issue under rule 65B.
Under this rule, which was enacted in its present form in 1991, relief is available for
several categories of injury, including the wrongful use of or failure to exercise public
authority. Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(e) (1992). Under subsection (e), "[appropriate relief may be
granted:

(A) where an inferior court, administrative agency, or officer exercising judicial

functions has exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion . . . ."
Although the form of rule 65B has been substantially changed recently, the substantive
intent behind the rule, and the requirements for its application, have not changed over the last
several decades. The Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Court of Appeals have given instruction as to how this rule governing extraordinary writs is to be applied. Most instructive are
the guidelines set forth in Anderson v. Baker. 5 Utah 2d 33, 296 P.2d 283 (1956):
(1) If the lower tribunal is without jurisdiction or is proceeding in
excess of its jurisdiction and there is no adequate remedy, the writ should
issue as a matter of right.

(2) If the lower tribunal is proceeding without jurisdiction, but it
appears that there is an adequate remedy, the writ should generally not issue,
but the court is not entirely without discretion.
(3) If the lower tribunal has jurisdiction but it appears that by an
erroneous order it has placed one party in a position where he will be
irreparably injured and that he has no adequate remedy to prevent the injury
or retrieve his loss, then the court may in the exercise of its sound discretion
use the writ as a procedure for intermediate review.
(4) If there is no want or excess of jurisdiction and there is an
adequate remedy, the writ should never issue.
Rules (1) and (4) are absolutes. Rules (2) and (3) are guides.
Id. at 285-86, (citations omitted) (emphasis in original) (quoting Robinson v. City Court for
Citv of Qgden. 112 Utah 36, 185 P.2d 256, 261)).
In the present case, petitioners are appealing from orders of an administrative agency
which are, in their view, abuses of the agency's discretion, thus falling squarely within
subsection (e) of the rule.

This situation also falls within section (3) of the Anderson

guidelines, in that the Division has jurisdiction over the matter but the erroneous orders of the
Division are placing petitioners in a position where they will be irreparably injured absent
immediate review of the orders, and there is no other remedy of any sort available for
petitioners.

Consequently, this Court may, in the exercise of its sound discretion, use an

extraordinary writ as a procedure for the intermediate review of the present orders.
It is axiomatic that a party who has an adequate remedy at law cannot avail himself of
a rule 65B petition. For example, the plaintiff, in Crist v. Mapleton Citv. 28 Utah 207, 497
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P.2d 633, 634 (Utah 1972), did not avail himself of readily available remedies at law, so
"placed himself out of the reach of the extraordinary writ of mandamus." Likewise, the
Anderson court ruled that "[a]n extraordinary writ is not a proceeding for general review, and
cannot be used as such/ Anderson. 296 P.2d at 285. Should this tribunal determine that an
appeal under rule 14 is unavailable to petitioners, there is no other available remedy and
petitioners should be entitled to review of the orders under rule 65B.
It is equally axiomatic that where there is no adequate remedy at law, a rule 65B
petition is available. For example, the Utah Court of Appeals, in Davis County v. Clearfield
Citv. 756 P.2d 704 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), found that an action for extraordinary relief was the
appropriate vehicle for obtaining review of the Davis City Council's decision to uphold denial
of a conditional use permit sought by Davis County where there was no statutory provision for
review of a city council action. I$i. at 707. Petitioners, should this Court determine that a rule
14 petition is unavailable, will be similarly situated with Davis County; a rule 65B writ should,
therefore, be available to petitioners.
In the present case, it is impractical and inappropriate to file this petition for a writ in
the Division because there is no procedural provision for filing such a writ before the Division
and a request to to the Division to reverse the order will likely be an exercise in futility.
MEMORANDUM ON THE MERITS
A petition for review brought under rule 14 does not require a memorandum on the
merits of the case to be filed at the time the Petition is filed; briefing occurs pursuant to rules

18, 24, and other applicable rules of the Utah appellate courts subsequent to the filing of the
Petition. Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires that a Petition for
Extraordinary Writ be accompanied by a memorandum of points and authorities in support of
the Petition. Petitioner has not filed such a memorandum concurrently with this Petition for
two reasons: First, petitioner has brought this Petition, in the first alternative, as a rule 14
Petition; should this Court determine that rule 14 relief is unavailable to petitioners then
petitioners will promptly submit a rule 19 memorandum. Second, to adequately brief the merits
of the issues, petitioners must have access to the transcript of the relevant proceedings before
the Division. No transcript has yet been prepared, but, under the procedures outlined in rules
15 and 16 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, would become available. Should this
Court grant review on either theory, petitioners seek the assistance of this Court in obtaining
the record of the proceedings from the Division, including the relevant transcripts. Petitioners
also seek leave of the court in either granting them the opportunity to fully brief the merits of
the issues pursuant to rules 18, 24, and all other applicable rules or, in the alternative, granting
them an extension of time in which to file a rule 19 memorandum of points and authorities on
the merits of the issues.
CONCLUSION
Petitioners respectfully request that this Court grant their Petition for Review under the
provisions of rule 14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and Utah Code Ann. §63-46b12(2)(b). Should this Court determine that a Petition for Review is not available to petitioners
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under these rules, petitionen request that this Coun grant review through rule 65B of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure and rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Should this Court grant review under either theory, petitioners seek the assistance of
the Court in obtaining the record of the proceedings, including the relevant transcripts, from
the Division, and permission to brief the merits of the issues in full upon receipt of the
transcripts.
DATED this " 7 ^

day of May, 1992.

JACKSON HOWARD, /
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, and
LINDA J. BARCLAY, for
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Petitioners
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APPENDIX D

Art. 1, § 11

Sec. 11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.]
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injur}- done to him in his
person property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law. which
sha be administered without denial or unnecessary delav; and no person
shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before a n / tribunal in this
Mate, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party.
History: Const. 1896.

13-1-12. Order by hearing officer or body — Appeal of order to the division director or the executive director.
(1) (a) At the close of an adjudicative proceeding, the administrative law
judge or an occupational board or representative committee with assistance from the administrative law judge, shall issue an order.
(b^ The order may be appealed to the executive director or the division
director for review.
(2) If a division director is unable for any reason to fairly review or rule
upon an order of the administrative law judge or a board or committee, the
executive director shall review and rule upon the order.

63-46b-14. Judicial review — Exhaustion of administrative remedies.
(1» A party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of final agency action,
except in actions where judicial review is expressly prohibited by statute.
(2) A party may seek judicial review only after exhausting all administrative remedies available, except that:
(a) a party seeking judicial review need not exhaust administrative
remedies if this chapter or any other statute states that exhaustion is not
required;
(b> the court may relieve a party seeking judicial review of the requirement to exhaust any or all administrative remedies if:
(i) the administrative remedies are inadequate; or
(ii) exhaustion of remedies would result in irreparable harm disproportionate to the public benefit derived from requiring exhaustion.
(3) (a> A party shall file a petition for judicial review of final agency action
within 30 days after the date that the order constituting the final agency
action is issued or is considered to have been issued under Subsection
63-46b-13«3nbi.
(b> The petition shall name the agency and all other appropriate parties as respondents and shall meet the form requirements specified in this
chapter.

63-46b-16. Judicial review — Formal adjudicative proceedings.
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has
jurisdiction to review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings.
(2> (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal
adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review of
agency action with the appropriate appellate court in the form required
by the appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court.
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern
all additional filings and proceedings in the appellate court.
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial
review of formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, except that:
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten, summarize, or organize the record;
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and
copies for the record:
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to
shorten, summarize, or organize the record; or
(ii) according to any other provision of law.
(4» The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's
record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by any of the following:
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action
is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied;
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any statute;
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution;
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law;
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making process, or has failed to follow prescribed procedure;
(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a
decision-making body or were subject to disqualification;
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or
implied by the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when
viewed in light of the whole record before the court;
(h) the agency action is:
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute;
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency;
(hi) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justifies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a
fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; or
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious.

63-46b-18. Judicial review — Stay and other temporary
remedies pending final disposition.
(1) Unless precluded b> another statute, the agenc} ma\ grant a sta} of its
order or other temporan remed} during the pendenc} of judicial review, according to the agenc\'s rules
(2) Parties shall petition the agency for a stay or other temporar} remedies
unless extraordmarv circumstances require immediate judicial intervention
(3) If the agenc}* denies a sta} or denies other temporary remedies requested b\ a part\, the agencVs order of denial shall be mailed to all parties
and shallspecifv the reasons wh} the sta} or other temporary remed} was not
granted
.
(4) If the agenc} has denied a stay or other temporar} remed} to protect the
public health safet}, or welfare against a substantial threat the court ma}
not grant a sta} or other temporar} remed} unless it finds that
(a) the agenc} violated its own rules m den}ing the sta} or
(bi <i) the part} seeking judicial review is hkeh to prevail on the
merits when the court finalh disposes of the matter,
<\V the party seeking judicial review will suffer irreparable injury
without immediate relief
(in) granting relief to the part} seeking review will not substant i a l harm other parties to the proceedings, and
m i the threat to the public health safet} or welfare relied upon
b} the agenc\ is not sufficient^ serious to justif} the agenc} s action
under the circumstances

78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
(1' The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinan writs
and to issue all writs and process necessar}
(a) to c a m into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees, or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction
(2> The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutor} appeals over
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies except the Public Service Commission, State Tax Commission Board of State Lands, Board of
Oil, Gas and Mining and the state engineer,
(b) appeals from the district court review of
d) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of
the state or other local agencies and
(n) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12 1,
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts,
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except those from the small claims
department of a circuit court,
(e) interlocutor} appeals from an} court of record in criminal cases,
except those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felon},
(f) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felon},
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordmar} writs sought b}
persons who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence,
except petitions constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence
for a first degree or capital felon},
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including but not limited to, divorce, annulment propert} division, child
custod} support, visitation, adoption, and paternit},
(D appeals from the Utah Mihtan Court, and
(ji cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court
(3' The Court of Appeals upon its own motion onh and b\ the vote of four
judges of the court ma} certifv to the Supreme Court for original appellate
review and determination an} matter over which the Court of Appeals has
original appellate jurisdiction
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63
Chapter 46b, in its review of agenc} adjudicative proceedings

Rule 5. Discretionary appeals from interlocutory orders.
J u P e t i t * o n f o r Permission to appeal. An appeal from an interlocutory
b y a ny p a r t y b y fllin
f J Z ^ ^1 I. t efr lUght
,
B a P e t i t 3 0 n f o r permission to appeal
ocutor
S ™
y order with the clerk of the appellate court with jurisdic+ ?
t^on over the case within 20 days after the entry of the order of the trial court,
with proof of service on all other parties to the action.
<b) tees and copies of petition. The petitioner shall file with the Clerk of
the bupreme Court an original and seven copies of the petition, or, with the
Uerk of the Court of Appeals, an original and four copies, together with the
fee for filing a notice of appeal in the trial court and the docketing fee in the
appe ate court. If an order is issued authorizing the appeal, the clerk of the
appellate court shall immediately give notice of the order bv mail to the
respective parties and shall transmit a certified copv of the o'rder, together
with a copy of the petition and filing fee, to the trial court where the petition
and order shall be filed in lieu of a notice of appeal. If the petition is denied.
the filing fee shall be refunded.
(c) Content of petition. The petition shall contain:
(1> A statement of the facts necessary to an understanding of the controlling question of law determined by the order sought to be reviewed;
(2> A statement of the question of law and a demonstration that the
question was properly raised before the trial court and ruled upon;
(3> A statement of the reasons why an immediate interlocutor}' appeal
should be permitted; and
(4) A statement of the reason why the appeal may materially advance
the termination of the litigation.
(5) The petition shall include a copy of the order of the trial court from
which an appeal is sought and any related findings of fact, conclusions of
law and opinion.
(d> Answer. Within 10 days after service of the petition, any other party
may file an answer in opposition or concurrence. An original and seven copies
of the answer shall be filed in the Supreme Court. An original and four copies
shall be filed in the Court of Appeals The petition and any answer shall be
submitted without oral argument unless otherwise ordered.
(e^ Grant of permission. An appeal from an interlocutory order may be
granted only if it appears that the order involves substantial rights and may
materially affect the final decision or that a determination of the correctness
of the order before final judgment will better serve the administration and
interests of justice. The order permitting the appeal may set forth the particular issue or point of law which will be considered and may be on such terms,
including the filing of a bond for costs and damages, as the appellate court
may determine. If the petition is granted, the appeal shall be deemed to have
been docketed by the granting of the petition, and all proceedings subsequent
to the granting of the petition shall be as. and within the time required, for
appeals from final judgments.

TITLE III.
REVIEW AND ENFORCEMENT OF ORDERS OF
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES, COMMISSIONS, AND COMMITTEES.
Rule 14. Review of administrative orders: how obtained;
intervention.
(a» Petition for review of order; joint petition. When judicial re\ iew by
the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals is provided b\ statute of an order
or decision of an administrative agency, board, commission, committee, or
officer (hereinafter the term "agency" shall include agency, board commission committee, or officer), a petition for review shall be filed with the clerk of
the appellate court within the time prescribed b\ statute, or if there is no time
prescribed then within 30 days after the date of the written decision or order
The term ' petition for review" includes a petition to enjoin set aside suspend,
modif>. or otherwise review a notice of appeal or a writ of certiorari The
petition shall specify the parties seeking review and shall designate the respondents and the order or decision, or part thereof, to be reviewed In each
case, the agency shall be named respondent The State of Utah shall be
deemed a respondent if so required by statute, even though not so designated
m the petition If two or more persons are entitled to petition for review of the
same order and their interests are such as to make joinder practicable, they
may file a joint petition for review and ma> thereafter proceed as a single
petitioner
(b) Statutory and docketing fees. At the time of filing any petition for
review, the party obtaining the review shall pa> to the clerk of the appellate
court such filing fees as are established by law, and also the fee for docketing
the appeal The clerk shall not accept a petition for review unless the filing
and docketing fees are paid
(c) Service of petition. A copy of the petition for review shall be served by
the petitioner on the named respondents), upon all other parties to the proceeding before the agency, and upon the Attorney General of Utah, if the state
is a part\, m the manner prescribed b> Rule 3'e) The petitioner, at the time of
filing the petition for review, shall also file with the clerk of the appellate
court a certificate reflecting service upon all parties to the agency proceeding
who have been served
(d^ Intervention. Any person who seeks to intervene in a proceeding under
this rule shall serve upon all parties to the proceeding and upon all parties
who participated before the agency, and file with the clerk of the appellate
court a motion for leave to intervene The motion shall contain a concise
statement of the interest of the moving party and the grounds upon which
intervention is sought A motion for leave to intervene shall be filed within 40
days of the date on which the petition for review is filed

Rule 17. Stay pending review.
Application for a stay of a decision or order of an agency pending direct
review m the appellate court shall ordinarily be made in the first instance to
the agenc\ if the agenc> is authorized b\ law to grant a stay If a motion for
such relief is made to the appellate court, the motion shall show that application to the agenc\ for the relief sought is not practicable, or that application
has been made to the agenc) and denied, with the reasons given by it for
denial The motion shall also show the reasons for the relief requested and the
facts relied upon and if the facts are subject to dispute, the motion shall be
supported by affidavits or other sworn statements or copies thereof With the
motion shall be filed those parts of the record relevant to the relief sought
Rpacnnahle notice of the filing of the motion and am hearing shall be given to
all parties to the proceeding in the appellate court The appellate court mav
condition relief under this rule upon the filing of a bond or other appJopmte
security The motion shall be filed with the clerk and normally w i l l b e S
ered b> the court, but in exceptional cases where such procedure would be
impracticable due to the requirements of time, the application may be consid
ered by a single justice or judge of the court

Rule 19. Extraordinary writs.
(a) Petition for extraordinary writ to a judge or agency; petition; service and filing. An application for a writ of quo warranto, mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, or other extraordinary writ referred to in Rule 65B, Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, except a writ of habeas corpus, directed to a judge,
agency, person or entity shall be made by filing a petition with the clerk of the
appellate court or, in an emergency, with a justice or judge of the appellate
court. Service of the petition shall be made on the respondent judge, agency,
person, or entity and on all parties to the action or case in the trial court or
agency. In the event of an original petition in the appellate court where no
action is pending in the trial court or agency, the petition shall be served
personally on the respondent judge, agency, person or entity and service shall
be made by the most direct means available on all persons or associations
whose interests might be substantially affected.
(b> Contents of petition and docket fee. A petition for an extraordinary
writ shall contain the following:
( D A statement of all persons or associations, by name or by class,
whose interests might be substantially affected;
(2) A statement of the issues presented and of the relief sought:
(3) A statement of the facts necessary to an understanding of the issues
presented by the petition;
(4) A statement of the reasons why no other plain, speedy, or adequate
remedy exists and why the writ should issue;
(5) Except in cases where the writ is directed to a district court, a
statement explaining why it is impractical or inappropriate to file the
petition for a writ in the district court;
(6) Copies of any order or opinion or parts of the record which may be
essential to an understanding of the matters set forth in the petition: and
(7) A memorandum of points and authorities in support of the petition.
Upon receipt of the prescribed docket fee, unless waived by the court, the
clerk shall docket the petition.
(c) Response to petition and oral argument. Within seven days after
service of the petition, or such shorter time as may be fixed by the appellate
court, any respondent or any other party may file a response in opposition or
concurrence, together with a supporting memorandum of law. The judge.
agency, person, or entity and all parties in the action other than the petitioner
shall be deemed respondents for all purposes. Two or more respondents may
respond jointly. If any respondent does not desire to appear in the proceedings.
that respondent may advise the clerk of the appellate court and all parties by
letter, but the petition shall not thereby be taken as admitted. Unless the
appellate court determines that the petition is frivolous on its face, the clerk
shall advise the parties of the date of oral argument.
(d) Denial or grant of petition. The court shall deny or grant the petition,
and the clerk shall immediately notify the petitioner and all respondents of
the court's determination. In an emergency, a single justice or judge may
grant a writ subject to review by the court at the earliest possible time.
(e) Effect of granting petition for writ of quo warranto or certiorari.
If the appellate court grants a petition for a writ of quo warranto or certiorari,
it shall order the record to be transmitted by the respondent to whom the writ
is directed. The briefing and oral argument shall proceed on a expedited basis.
and the clerk shall advise all parties of the dates on which briefs are to be filed
and of the date of oral argument. Briefs submitted pursuant to this subsection
shall address the merits and shall comply with the requirements of Rules 24
and 27. The appellate court shall issue its opinion as in other cases.
(f) Number of copies. An original and seven copies of the petition and any
response shall be filed in the Supreme Court. An original and four copies of
the petition and any response shall be filed in the Court of Appeals.
(g) Issuance of extraordinary writ by appellate court sua sponte. The
appellate court, in aid of its own jurisdiction in extraordinary cases, may issue
a writ of certiorari sua sponte directed to a judge, agency, person, or entity. A
copy of the writ shall be served on the named respondents in the manner and
by an individual authorized to accomplish personal service under Rule 4.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In addition, copies of the writ shall be transmitted by the clerk of the appellate court, by the most direct means available.
to all persons or associations whose interests might be substantially affected
by the writ. The respondents and the persons or associations whose interests
are substantially affected may, within four days of the issuance of the writ.
petition the court to dissolve or amend the writ. The petition shall be accompanied by a concise statement of the reasons for dissolution or amendment of

Rule 65B. Extraordinary relief.
(a) Availability of remedy. Where no other plain, speed) and adequate
remedy is available, a person may petition the court for extraordinary relief
on any of the grounds set forth in paragraph <b> (involving wrongful imprisonment), paragraph (c) (involving other types of wrongful restraint on personal
liberty), paragraph (d» (involving the wrongful use of public or corporate authority) or paragraph (e) (involving the wrongful use of judicial authority and
the failure to exercise such authority). There shall be no special form of writ
The procedures in this rule shall govern proceedings on all petitions for extraordinary relief To the extent that this rule does not provide special procedures, proceedings on petitions for extraordinary relief shall be governed b\
the procedures set forth elsewhere in these rules
(b) Wrongful imprisonment.
(1) Scope. Any person committed by a court to imprisonment in a state
prison, other correctional facility or count) jail who asserts that the commitment resulted from a substantial denial of rights may petition the
court for relief under this paragraph This paragraph (b> shall govern
proceedings based on claims relating to original commitments and commitments for violation of probation or parole This paragraph b shall not
govern proceedings based on claims relating to the terms or conditions of
confinement
(2> Commencement. The proceeding shall be commenced b> filing a
petition, together with a cop\ thereof with the clerk of the court in uhich
the commitment leading to confinement v>as issued except that the court
may order a change of \enue on motion of a part\ for the comenience of
the parties or witnesses
(3) Contents of the petition. The petition shall set forth all claims
that the petitioner has in relation to the legality of the commitment
Additional claims relating to the legality of the commitment ma\ not be
raised in subsequent proceedings except for good cause shown The petition shall state
(i) the place where the petitioner is restrained.
(n» the name of the court by which the petitioner was convicted
and sentenced and the dates of proceedings in *hich the conviction
was entered, together with the court's case number for those proceedings, if known by the petitioner,
(mi in plain and concise terms, all of the facts on the basis of uhich
the petitioner claims a substantial violation of rights as the result of
the commitment,
(iv) whether or not the judgment of conviction or the commitment
for violation of probation or parole has been reviewed on appeal, and
if so, the number and caption or title of the appellate proceeding and
the results of the review,
(v) whether the legality of the commitment has already been adjudicated in any prior post-conviction or other civil proceeding, and if so
the reasons for the denial of relief in the prior proceeding
(4) Attachments to the petition. The petitioner shall attach to the
petition affidavits, copies of records or other evidence available to the
petitioner in support of the allegations The petitioner shall also attach to
the petition a copy of the pleadings filed by the petitioner in any prior
post-conviction or other civil proceeding that adjudicated the legality of
the commitment, and a copy of all orders and memoranda of the court If
copies of pertinent pleadings, orders, and memoranda are not attached,
the petition shall state wh\ they are not attached
(5) Memorandum of authorities. The petitioner shall not set forth
argument or citations or discuss authorities in the petition but these may
be set out in a separate memorandum, two copies of which shall be filed
with the petition

(6) Assignment by the presiding judge. On the filing of the petition,
the clerk shall promptly deliver it to the presiding judge of the court in
which it is filed. The presiding judge shall if possible assign the proceeding to the judge who issued the commitment.
(7) Dismissal of frivolous claims. On review of the petition, if it is
apparent to the court that the issues presented in the petition have already been adjudicated in a prior proceeding, or if for any other reason
any claim in the petition shall appear frivolous on its face, the court shall
forthwith issue an order dismissing the claim, stating that the claim is
frivolous on its face. The order shall be sent by mail to the petitioner.
Proceedings on the claim shall terminate with the entry of the order of
dismissal. The order of dismissal need not recite findings of fact or conclusions of law.
(8/ Service of petitions. If, on review of the petition, the court concludes that all or part of the petition is not frivolous on its face, the court
shall designate the portions of the petition that are not frivolous and
direct the clerk to serve a copy of the petition and a copy of any memorandum by mail upon the attorney general and the county attorney.
(91 Responsive pleading. Within twenty days (plus time allowed under these rules for service by mail) after service of a copy of the petition
upon the attorney general and county attorney, or within such other
period of time as the court may allow, the attorney general or county
attorney shall answer or otherwise respond to the portions of the petition
that have not been dismissed and shall serve the answer or other response
upon the petitioner in accordance with Rule 5(b). Within twenty days
(plus time allowed for service by mail' after service of any motion to
dismiss or for summary judgment, the petitioner may respond by memorandum to the motion. No further pleadings or amendments will be permitted unless ordered by the court.
(10) Hearings. After pleadings are closed, the court shall promptly set
the proceeding for a hearing or otherwise dispose of the case. Upon motion
for good cause, the court may grant leave to either party to take discovery
or to extend the date for the hearing. Prior to the hearing, the court may
order either the petitioner or the state or county to obtain any relevant
transcript or court records. The court may also order a prehearing conference, but the conference shall not be set so as to delay unreasonably the
hearing on the merits of the petition. The petitioner shall be present
before the court at hearings on dispositive issues but need not otherwise
be present in court during the proceeding.
(11) Orders. If the court rules in favor of the petitioner, it shall enter
an appropriate order with respect to the validity of the challenged commitment and with respect to rearraignment, retrial, resentencing, custody, bail or discharge. The court shall enter findings of fact and conclusions of law, as appropriate, following any evidentiary hearing or any
hearing on a dispositive motion. Upon application of the attorney general
or the county attorney, or upon its own motion, the court may stay release
of the petitioner pending appeal of its order.
(12> Costs. The court may assign the costs of the proceeding, as allowed under Rule 54(d), to any party as it deems appropriate. If the
petitioner is unable to pay the costs of the proceeding, the petitioner may
proceed upon an affidavit of impecuniosity, in which event the court may
direct that the costs be paid by the county in which the complainant was
originally charged.
(13 > Appeal. Any final judgment or order entered upon the petition
may be appealed to and reviewed by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme
Court of Utah in accord with the statutes governing appeals to those
courts.
(c> Other wrongful restraints on personal liberty.
(1' Scope. Except for instances governed by paragraph (b> of this rule.
this paragraph to shall govern all petitions claiming that a person has
been wrongfully restrained of personal liberty, and the court may grant
relief appropriate under this paragraph.
<2» Commencement. The proceeding shall be commenced by filing a
petition with the clerk of the court in the district in which the petitioner
is restrained or the respondent resides or in which the alleged restraint is

(3» Contents of the petition and attachments. The petition shall
contain a short, plain statement of the facts on the basis of which the
petitioner seeks relief It shall identify the respondent and the place
where the person is restrained It shall state the cause or pretense of the
restraint, if known by the petitioner It shall state whether the legaht} of
the restraint has already been adjudicated in a prior proceeding and, if so.
the reasons for the denial of relief in the prior proceeding The petitioner
shall attach to the petition any legal process available to the petitioner
that resulted in restraint The petitioner shall also attach to the petition a
copy of the pleadings filed by the petitioner in any prior proceeding that
adjudicated the legality of the restraint
(4) Dismissal of frivolous claims. On review of the petition if it is
apparent to the court that the legality of the restraint has already been
adjudicated in a prior proceeding, or if for any other reason any claim in
the petition shall appear frivolous on its face, the court shall forthwith
issue an order dismissing the claim, stating that the claim is frivolous on
its face and the reasons for this conclusion The order shall be sent by
mail to the petitioner Proceedings on the claim shall terminate with the
entry of the order of dismissal
(5 i Issuance and contents of the hearing order. If the petition is
not dismissed as being frivolous on its face, the court shall issue a hearing
order directing the respondent to appear before the court at a specified
time for a hearing on the legality of the restraint The court shall direct
the clerk to serve a copy of the petition and the hearing order by mail
upon the respondent In the hearing order, the court may direct the respondent to bring before it the person alleged to be restrained The court
may direct the respondent to file an answer to the petition within a period
of time specified in the hearing order If the petitioner waives the right to
be present at the hearing the hearing order shall be modified accordingly
(6) Temporary relief. If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained will be removed from the court's jurisdiction or will suffer irreparable injury before compliance with the hearing order can be enforced the
court shall issue a warrant directing the sheriff to bring the respondent
before the court to be dealt with according to law Pending a determination of the petition, the court may place the person alleged to have been
restrained in the custody of such other persons as may be appropriate
(7) Alternative service of the hearing order. If the respondent cannot be found, or if it appears that a person other than the respondent has
custody of the person alleged to be restrained, the hearing order and any
other process issued by the court may be served on the person having
custody m the manner and with the same effect as if that person had been
named as respondent in the action
(8) Avoidance of service by respondent. If anyone having custody of
the person alleged to be restrained avoids service of the hearing order or
attempts wrongfully to remove the person from the court's jurisdiction
the sheriff shall immediately arrest the responsible person The sheriff
shall forthwith bring the person arrested before the court to be dealt with
according to law
(9) Hearing and subsequent proceedings. At the time specified in
the hearing order for the hearing the court shall hear the matter in a
summary fashion and shall render judgment accordingly The respondent
or other person having custody shall appear with the person alleged to be
restrained or shall state the reasons for failing to do so If the hearing
order requires an answer to the petition, the respondent shall file an
answer within the time prescribed m the hearing order The answer shall
state plainly whether the respondent has restrained the person alleged to
have been restrained, whether the person so restrained has been transferred to any other person, and if so the identity of the transferee, the date
of the transfer, and the reason or authority for the transfer The hearing
order shall not be disobeyed for any defect of form or any misdescription
in the order or the petition, if enough is stated to impart the meaning and
intent of the proceeding to the respondent

(d) Wrongful use of or failure to exercise public authority.
(1) Who may petition the court; security. The attorney general may,
and when directed to do so by the governor shall, petition the court for
relief on the grounds enumerated in this paragraph (di. Any person who
is not required to be represented by the attorney general and who is
aggrieved or threatened by one of the acts enumerated in subparagraph
(2* of this paragraph (d) may petition the court under this paragraph id' if
(A) the person claims to be entitled to an office unlawfully held by another or (B) if the attorney general fails to file a petition under this
paragraph after receiving notice of the person's claim. A petition filed by
a person other than the attorney general under this paragraph shall be
brought in the name of the petitioner, and the petition shall be accompanied by an undertaking with sufficient sureties to pay any judgment for
costs and damages that may be recovered against the petitioner in the
proceeding. The sureties shall be in the form for bonds on appeal provided
for in Rule 73.
(2) Grounds for relief. Appropriate relief may be granted: (A) where a
person usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public
office, whether civil or military, a franchise, or an office in a corporation
created by the authority of the state of Utah; (B» where a public officer
does or permits any act that results in a forfeiture of the office; (C) where
persons act as a corporation in the state of Utah without being legally
incorporated; (D) where any corporation has violated the laws of the state
of Utah relating to the creation, alteration or renewal of corporations; or
(E» where any corporation has forfeited or misused its corporate rights,
privileges or franchises.
(3) Proceedings on the petition. On the filing of a petition, the court
may require that notice be given to adverse parties before issuing a hearing order, or may issue a hearing order requiring the adverse party to
appear at the hearing on the merits. The court may also grant temporary
relief in accordance with the terms of Rule 65A.
(e) Wrongful use of judicial authority or failure to comply with duty.
(1) Who may petition. A person aggrieved or whose interests are
threatened by any of the acts enumerated in this paragraph (e) may
petition the court for relief.
(2> Grounds for relief. Appropriate relief may be granted: (A) where
an inferior court, administrative agency, or officer exercising judicial
functions has exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion; (B) where
an inferior court, administrative agency, corporation or person has failed
to perform an act required by law as a duty of office, trust or station; or
(C) where an inferior court, administrative agency, corporation or person
has refused the petitioner the use or enjoyment of a right or office to
which the petitioner is entitled.
(3) Proceedings on the petition. On the filing of a petition, the court
may require that notice be given to adverse parties before issuing a hearing order, or may issue a hearing order requiring the adverse party to
appear at the hearing on the merits. The court may direct the inferior
court, administrative agency, officer, corporation or other person named
as respondent to deliver to the court a transcript or other record of the
proceedings. The court may also grant temporary relief in accordance
with the terms of Rule 65A.
(4) Scope of review. Where the challenged proceedings are judicial in
nature, the court's review shall not extend further than to determine
whether the respondent has regularly pursued its authority.
(Amended effective September 1, 1991.)

